Shaping the Future of ICP-2: Community Input Extended to December 2024

Mailman List Mirror (Read Only)
41

…
If the ASO AC wants community input and participation the process
they’ve picked is, respectfully, entirely wrong. Ideas need discussion
and debate to germinate and questionnaires fail to capture answers to
questions the author didn’t think to ask.

Good Morning Bill -

The ASO AC process is completely open to input from any interested party, as there is a wide range of communities that may want to provide input into the process. In some cases, communities may coalesce around a single submission and in others (such as I would expect among NANOGers) there’s likely to end up being a variety of different views submitted by those interested in this topic.

Nothing precludes you from having as much “discussion and debate” as you need for the germination of your ideas, but you do not get to constrain others as to how they wish to develop & submit their own ideas into the process.

The ASO AC will consider all of the input received on a global basis and use it to evolve the proposed ICP-2 principles accordingly. The ASO AC (also known as the NRO NC) is comprised of members that were elected by the community in each RIR region to represent the respective communities for these sorts of processes – just as they do in global Internet number resource policy development.

For the ARIN region, the representatives are Kevin Blumberg, Nick Nugent, and Chris Quesada (Chris serving thru 2024, with Amy Potter elected & starting in Jan 2025.) If you have concerns about the process being followed by the ASO AC in the development of the ICP-2 principles, I would suggest raising such with any of the representatives from this region.

Thanks!
/John

John Curran
President and CEO
American Registry for Internet Numbers

42

Hi John,

It seems to me that regulatory capture is just a little bit easier if
the feedback mechanism rewards groups who coalesce around a single
submission and doesn't intrinsically facilitate broad discussion of
the proffered ideas. But, as you say: that's just my opinion.

Regards,
Bill Herrin

43

Sorry, no. The question was about guiding principles for an updated
ICP between the RIRs. That’s what I responded to: improvements to that
document not “concerns” about individual RIRs.

You also requested a tangent about detail-level changes I might make
to the RIRs themselves, so I offered some ideas born from my direct
experience. Sorry that confused you.

Repeating my original question:

What is, in your opinion, the perfect scenario by which the functions of the RIRs today could be structured? The ‘if I could greenfield this today’ idea?

I was not asking about updates to ICP-2. I was specifically asking for your greenfield idea, in an attempt to work backwards and understand your concerns and perspective.

It’s clear you aren’t interested in actual debate and discussion , but would prefer to just stomp and yell. I’ll stop polluting everyone else’s inboxes trying to sort through that.

Take care.

44

Hi Tom,

Love the Amazon work-backwards technique but it's not always
instructive. My comments didn't and weren't intended to say much about
what I want the RIRs to change into. I think the RIRs should evolve
into what best serves their myriad communities. That's not something
that comes from a top-down vision, least of all mine. Instead, my
comments spoke to what I want the RIRs to NOT change into. The
perspective I'm coming from is this: what can go wrong, and how do we
head that off so it doesn't?

Does that answer the meta-question you wanted to explore?

Regards,
Bill Herrin

45

Hi Nanog Community

To further elaborate my opinions towards the ICP-2 questionnaire. I could like to share more my thoughts and insights

  1. ICP-2 Guides RIR Operations, Not Just Establishment While it’s true that ICP-2 defines the criteria for establishing new RIRs, it also serves as a foundational policy document that ensures consistency and cooperation among all RIRs. It is not limited to the act of creating RIRs—it provides principles that guide their governance and operations. Portability directly relates to these operational principles, as it ensures users can continue to rely on the RIR system regardless of where their resources are managed. Portability is not about dictating numbering policy; it’s about setting a baseline operational standard that all RIRs should meet to maintain trust and interoperability across regions. By making portability a hard requirement under ICP-2, we enhance the foundational framework that governs the relationship between users and RIRs.

  2. ICANN’s Role is to Safeguard Global Internet Stability ICANN’s role is to safeguard the stability, security, and interoperability of the global Internet. Portability aligns with this mandate because it ensures that resource holders are not trapped by a failing or underperforming RIR. If portability is not addressed under ICP-2, the global community risks fragmentation, where RIRs operate inconsistently, undermining the trust and cooperation that ICP-2 seeks to promote. This isn’t about ICANN imposing policies on RIRs; it’s about setting minimum operational criteria that support global continuity. Just as ICP-2 requires RIRs to meet technical and operational benchmarks to gain recognition, it can also mandate portability as a fundamental operational safeguard without interfering with individual RIRs’ PDPs.

  3. Precedents Exist for ICANN Setting Baselines Without Overreach There’s precedent for ICANN establishing baseline requirements that ensure the global stability of the Internet ecosystem. For example, in the DNS world, ICANN enforces requirements around portability of domain names between registries, which has proven critical to ensuring users’ trust and the resilience of the system. By defining portability in ICP-2, ICANN would not be mandating how RIRs allocate resources but rather ensuring that if a user chooses to move their resources, they can do so seamlessly. This is a safeguard that respects the autonomy of individual RIRs while ensuring a unified and resilient global Internet framework.

  4. Autonomy Doesn’t Mean Isolation While each RIR has its own Policy Development Process (PDP), that autonomy is not meant to create isolated silos. The RIR system operates as a global, cooperative framework. Portability strengthens this cooperation by ensuring that users can move resources across regions when needed without facing artificial barriers. It is consistent with the spirit of ICP-2, which emphasizes collaboration and consistent principles among RIRs.

  5. Users’ Rights Must Be Prioritized Ultimately, ICP-2 is about ensuring that RIRs serve the community effectively. If an RIR cannot fulfill its operational duties or if users face challenges, portability ensures that users are not left stranded. This is not a policy decision about how resources are managed—it’s about protecting users’ rights in the broader RIR system. ICANN has a responsibility to ensure that no matter where users choose to manage their resources, they are protected by minimum standards. By framing portability as a safeguard aligned with ICP-2’s operational principles rather than a numbering policy, you highlight how it fits within ICANN’s scope and contributes to the broader goals of stability, cooperation, and user protection.

Looking forward for more input.

Thanks

46

Bill -

I am not sure that there is any reward at all for groups that coalesce around a single submission; i.e., at the end of the day, a good idea is a good idea regardless of source.

As for regulatory capture, I imagine it could be considered a risk but having a single body (in this case, the ASO AC) digest all the input received is necessary of a process that is both global in scope and converges in reasonable time. I’ll admit that it does place significant faith in the capabilities of those elected to the ASO AC, but from what I’ve seen to date, that faith is indeed well-placed.

Thanks,
/John

John Curran
President and CEO
American Registry for Internet Numbers

47

Sun, Nov 17, 2024 at 12:48:04PM -0800, William Herrin:

  1. I’m not convinced that the service regions should be limited by the ICP to non-overlapping geographic territories.

While geographic monopolies may have made sense in the past, it is unclear to me how/why they make sense today (unless the point is to create/perpetuate a cartel).

I am curious as to what you mean by create/perpetuate a cartel?

A group of geographical monopolies who between them have total control
over what the essential service costs and whether anybody else can
perform it. It might as well be the definition of a cartel.

And, to the extent that the service provider must excel.

Competition is healthy for all enterprise.

The registries are more than just an enterprise boss.

They really aren’t. Contrary to the theories you keep pushing, they are businesses. They are not state agencies or quasi state agencies. They are not granted enforcement powers or any extraordinary legislative or judicial powers. They are run of the mill not-for-profit businesses.

Your theory here is nonsense. Can you perhaps think before you respond on some issues.

  1. It’s not a theory, it’s a statement of fact. Just because you don’t like it does not change that.

A business has private or public shareholders or stockholders who once all taxes have been deducted on the legal entity’s annual revenue or bottomline … the stockholders then enjoys dividends through board resolutions.

The Red Cross is a business. Kaiser permanents is a business. Neither fits your description above.

You have described one structure of a corporation, but the definition of a business is much broader.

Can you share any such proof or fillings that any of the RIR have shareholders and those shareholders distribute dividends or payouts annually to the RIR stockholders?

No, instead, I have pointed out the error in your definition of a business. Perhaps you should think on this a bit more before posting nonsense.

Owen

48

The RIRs each have a geographic monopoly and at their creation, this is required by ICP-2 (the original). This has nothing to do with where you land on any of your subsequent questions.

Are the European Union or African Union, geographic monopolies?

I don’t know enough about the structure of the African union to comment, but to the extent other territorial monopolies (the member nation states) have ceded sovereignty on specific topics to the EU, yes, the EU is a geographic monopoly.

The NRO cartel has agreed to specific territories served by each RIR, granting each a geographic monopoly.

You write as if a couple of guys formed an organization and decided how the system must work.

I didn’t specify quantity, but otherwise, your description isn’t far off from what happened.

FWIW, the RIRs (NRO) are an outcome of wider internet community engagents that lasted years if not decade for which you historically particpated in as a member of the said communities. Most of the rules of engagent were decided through wider consultations at policy debates and some by those elected by various internet communities.

The community had input, but in the early days, all of the decisions were made by small numbers of people behind closed doors who were supposed to consider, but not necessarily follow said community input.

Do not confuse the RIR/NRO system with the pseudo-private enterprises operated by sole propriators who believe that they can change a system that has served the public so well for decades and continue to do so.

I have no such illusions. However, I also don’t share your rose colored view of the current situation. Yes, the RIRs have mostly done a good job and 4 of them are operating similarly to what you describe (fortunately).

One is completely off the rails, has no legitimate board and no legitimate executive, continues to operate contrary to court orders, under the supposed leadership of a self-appointed former board member.

The fact that the other 4, the community, and the membership have no mechanism by which they can reign this behavior in is the primary source of the desire to change ICP-2 from a one and done document for creating RIRs to a document guiding the ongoing operation of RIRs and providing additional checks and balances to deal with rogue RIRs.

Because organizations served by RIRs are not constrained by those boundaries, many operate in more than one region and the rules get fuzzy, but in general, territorial exclusivity is long established.

And countries do have some embassies in different other countries.

Yes and no. Technically, embassies are considered sovereign territory of the country represented and inviolable by the host country.

Your comment is orthogonal to the geographic monopoly of the RIRs.

I’m not saying this is good or bad. I see benefits to it, but I also see reasons it might be better to phase it out.

In any case, it might be worth considering granting a certain right of a registrant to transfer the servicing of their registration to the RIR of their choosing.

Each region has its own rules of engagement. When such registrant decides to play in a certain service region, they must comply with existing rules of the game in the said region.

And what is to be done when the RIR chooses not to play by its own rules?

Owen

49

They really aren’t. Contrary to the theories you keep pushing, they are
businesses. They are not state agencies or quasi state agencies.
They are not granted enforcement powers or any extraordinary
legislative or judicial powers. They are run of the mill not-for-profit businesses.

A business has private or public shareholders or stockholders who
once all taxes have been deducted on the legal entity’s annual revenue
or bottomline … the stockholders then enjoys dividends through board resolutions.

Noah,

You are correct that a non-profit organization does not have owners
and thus does not produce profits for distribution to owners. Instead,
it has a board of directors with a legal duty to assure it operates
consistent with its non-profit mission.

Indeed…

Owen is correct that in every other respect, a non-profit organization
functions like any ordinary business.

Bill,

For the purposes of regulatory compliances, an NGO ought to ensure it meets its statutory liabilies just like any legal entity.

However, referring to the RIRs system as a cartel is misleading. We are choosing to throw the word cartel around as if the RIR lack accountability and operate without oversight yet we all here are members of such RIRs and we as a community have participated in the policy development processes that bore the rules of engagement for which the RIR system have operated-in for decades.

It turns out that this is the case. There is, at present, no mechanism for the NRO, the community, or the membership to reign in the actions or gain accountability over one of the five RIRs and no mechanism for revoking its accreditation or function as an RIR and transferring that critical role to any other entity. Instead, one man without mandate or authority continues to purport to be in charge of that RIR and run it as he sees fit. The entity in question has not a single board member, no CEO and has acted in violation of multiple court orders.

The entire purpose of this consultation is to correct the lack of foresight that led to this current state.

The administrators or if you will staff/employees of these RIR’s run them based on bylaws/constitutions that resource members have enacted. The policies each RIR follows to manage number resources in each region came to be through community consensus through the policy development processes that are open to public participation.

That is an act of blind faith. It’s worked out ok by and large because most of those staff have been ethical, honest, and dedicated employees providing exemplary service to their communities. Unfortunately, one exceptional case has created tremendous problems which continue to go unresolved for years at this point, clearly pointing out some flaws in the accountability and oversight processes in the current system.

How then can some of you claim that the RIRs are some sort of cartel.

I’ll leave this to the previously posted answers by Lee Howard and Bill Herrin as I believe they covered the topic well.

Are we saying that we the resource members who agreed on a constitutions for managing these organizations and go on to bankroll the systems through membership fees together with the wider internet communities who decide on the rules of engagement through the PDP, created cartels organizations in concert through our collective actions?

Yes. Yes, we did. To make matters worse, at least one of those organizations has gone rogue and there is no current mechanism for addressing that issue other than waiting for it to work through the courts of Mauritius and eventually the privy council in London.

Yes, we made these errors and this consultation is an effort to consider ways to address them.

Owen

50

Owen -

As the one who posted this topic to nanog, I feel some responsibility in seeing that its discussion is productive.

To that end, could you perhaps focus a bit more on expressing the principles that you see as important in a future ICP-2 policy, as these will be likely be more easily understood and considered by those on the list versus compared to just a rehashing of your views on a particular RIR’s challenges.

You note “this consultation is an effort to consider ways to address them”, so do you have any suggestions to that end?

Thanks,
/John

John Curran
President and CEO
American Registry for Internet Numbers

51

I personally think this entire process is the wrong answer to a semi right question. Contrary to popular illusion, ICP-2 is about the criteria by which ICANN can accept a new RIR into the system. In my opinion, there’s no need for significant improvement in that process.

The critical oversight that needs to be addressed is that we’ve made no allowance for disciplining or resolving rogue RIRs and now we have one.

Rather than seeking to turn ICP-2 into something it is not and never should have been, we should be seeking to develop a new document purpose built for dealing with the ongoing requirements and rules by which RIRs operate and remain in the system.

To that end, I do not think a simple majority vote of the NRO EC should be sufficient to remove an RIR from the system.

Said vote is a reasonable first step, but some mechanism must exist by which that vote must be ratified by a body that is both more accountable to and more representative of the larger community. Not a single member of the NRO EC is elected by anyone. Each of them is appointed by the respective boards of the RIRs in question. Further, a simple majority is only 3 votes. Surely, such a global and far reaching decision with such serious impact should be deliberated by a body of more than 5 individuals, one of which has a clear conflict of interest in the proceedings.

I hate this answer and hope someone else can come up with something better, but the best I’ve come up with so far is ratification by the board of the central registry (currently ICANN/PTI).

Owen

52

Owen,

I was the Chair of the NRO when it directed the ASO AC to embark on this project to strengthen ICP-2 in order to better represent the accountability of the RIR system to the Internet community. Accordingly, I will respond to that aspect of your post below. (I am otherwise intentionally refraining from discussing the particulars of the principles themselves, as this is a consultation of the community and its views on such topics.)

The process for recognizing an RIR is based predominantly on its initial compliance with the principles developed by this community. While it is theoretically possible to create a second policy document addressing ongoing compliance with the principles, doing so would require detailing the ongoing requirements and would open the possibility of misalignment of principles between the two documents. Furthermore, it would necessitate agreement by all parties to a second document and introduces risk of edge cases where RIRs might be party to one document but not the other.

It is not uncommon for the entire lifecycle of a relationship to be contained within a single document (covering establishment, joint activity, and termination). In light of the risks mentioned above, the NRO-EC asked the ASO AC to review and strengthen the existing ICP-2, ensuring its requirements were current and adequate. This approach seemed more straightforward than asking the ASO AC to both review and update the requirements within the existing ICP-2 policy document and then embark on creating an entirely new document “purpose built for dealing with the ongoing requirements and rules by which RIRs operate and remain in the system” as you suggested below.

I hope this helps explain the reasoning behind the current process (while recognizing that others may weigh the tradeoffs involved differently.)

Thanks!
/John

John Curran
President and CEO
American Registry for Internet Numbers

53

Hi,

A business has private or public shareholders or stockholders who once all taxes have been deducted on the legal entity's annual revenue or bottomline .. the stockholders then enjoys dividends through board resolutions.

You have described one structure of a corporation, but the definition of a business is much broader.

FWIW, unsurprisingly, the definition of “business” varies depending on country and their legal system and context (e.g., legal, tax, or regulatory).

Regards,
-drc

54

I certainly understand the appeal of the expedient, but I still feel that such a change to ICP-2 should require the same rigors as a new document in order to have legitimacy, thus, if this is an effort to short cut that process, it feels wrong to me. Others may well have different opinions, but you specifically asked for mine.

Owen

55

Hi,

A business has private or public shareholders or stockholders who once all taxes have been deducted on the legal entity's annual revenue or bottomline .. the stockholders then enjoys dividends through board resolutions.

You have described one structure of a corporation, but the definition of a business is much broader.

FWIW, unsurprisingly, the definition of “business” varies depending on country and their legal system and context (e.g., legal, tax, or regulatory).

Is there any one of the 5 jurisdictions where RIRs operate that do not define the existing RIR in that jurisdiction as a business?

I know, for example that ARIN is definitely a business by the applicable definition.

AFRINIC is a “corporation limited buy guarantee” and chartered under the companies act of Mauritius. I’d say that “company” and “business” are sufficiently synonymous to say that is the case there.

I’m less familiar with the legal frameworks and charters of the other three, but I’m pretty sure RIPE NCC is a business by the rules there.

Owen

56

It appears that Owen DeLong via NANOG <owen@delong.com> said:

Is there any one of the 5 jurisdictions where RIRs operate that do not define the existing RIR in that jurisdiction as a business?

I know, for example that ARIN is definitely a business by the applicable definition.

ARIN is a Virginia nonstock corporation which has a 501(c)(3) charitable registration with the IRS.

It seems to be a theological argument whether you consider that to be a business. Most definitions
of business include an intention to make a profit, which rules out ARIN.

I’m less familiar with the legal frameworks and charters of the other three, but I’m pretty sure RIPE NCC
is a business by the rules there.

RIPE is a non-profit association under Dutch law. LACNIC is a non-profit association under Uruguay law.
Same theological argument.

APNIC is an Australian Pty Ltd so you can make a somewhat stronger argument that it's a business,
although in practice it seems to operate a lot like ARIN, RIPE, and LACNIC.

At this point I wouldn't try to guess what Afrinic is.

R's,
John

57

A business has private or public shareholders or stockholders who once all taxes have been deducted on the legal entity’s annual revenue or bottomline … the stockholders then enjoys dividends through board resolutions.

The Red Cross is a business. Kaiser permanents is a business. Neither fits your description above.

You have described one structure of a corporation, but the definition of a business is much broader.

The corporation of resource members are not a business that is why they are structured as not-for-profit organisations.

In the case of RIR such as a legal entity AFRINIC, we resource members through our bylaws appoint directors as guarantors so as to comply with the Mauritius Companies Act and meet statutoty liabilities and that’s just about it. We dont take profits.

Can you share any such proof or fillings that any of the RIR have shareholders and those shareholders distribute dividends or payouts annually to the RIR stockholders?

No, instead, I have pointed out the error in your definition of a business. Perhaps you should think on this a bit more before posting nonsense.

There is no error in my defination. The confusion is with your language English which we can agree to disagree.

In my language Swahili, the word “business” translates to “Biashara”.

https://sw.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biashara

AFRINIC sio Biashara. RIR sio Biashara ya mtu au watu binafsi.

Noah

58

It appears that Owen DeLong via NANOG <owen@delong.com> said:

Is there any one of the 5 jurisdictions where RIRs operate that do not define the existing RIR in that jurisdiction as a business?

I know, for example that ARIN is definitely a business by the applicable definition.

ARIN is a Virginia nonstock corporation which has a 501(c)(3) charitable registration with the IRS.

It seems to be a theological argument whether you consider that to be a business. Most definitions
of business include an intention to make a profit, which rules out ARIN.

I’m less familiar with the legal frameworks and charters of the other three, but I’m pretty sure RIPE NCC
is a business by the rules there.

RIPE is a non-profit association under Dutch law. LACNIC is a non-profit association under Uruguay law.
Same theological argument.

APNIC is an Australian Pty Ltd so you can make a somewhat stronger argument that it’s a business,
although in practice it seems to operate a lot like ARIN, RIPE, and LACNIC.

We put above…

The small anti-RIR folks, think of RIR as book keepers doing some sort of commercial exchange of goods (IPv$) which they consider as a commodity to be traded for direct financial gains.

They both reject the ideals of membership-based cooperation and need-based resource allocation for public use to deliver digital good&services and they instead subscribe to straight up profit based transactions without any digital services provisions.

Therefore its in their best interest to make such claims as RIRs are straight up businesses.

At this point I wouldn’t try to guess what Afrinic is.

And nor is Afrinic a Business. Its a cooperation of members limited by guarantee as long as we the guarantors ensure compliance to statutory liabilities inline with the company Act of Mauritius.

The system basically operate as a not-for-profit. It pays debts ( in otherwords taxes) as required by the law and that just about it.

Noah

59

Can either one of you explain what possible difference it makes
whether the rest of us consider the RIRs a business? We all agree that
the RIRs have no shareholders and thus are not engaged in maximizing
their shareholders' value.

Regards,
Bill Herrin

60

The RIRs are legal not-for-profit cooperations with a clear not-for-profit mandate. Period.

Noah