I rejected the premise of your question. In my view, you tried to
shape it to get the answer you wanted.
If you expand the question to examples of a government jurisdiction
under which ICANN falls attempting to direct the action of a private
third-party organization in the tech industry in a manner that
contravenes otherwise lawful services to its customers, I refer you to
the above.
2. I'm not convinced that the service regions should be limited by the
ICP to non-overlapping geographic territories. Although I generally
favor geographic restriction as a matter of practice, perhaps it would
be better to require unanimous assent to permit an RIR to operate with
an overlapping territory.
RIRs already register resources to organisations in other regions. The
fact that many registrants of ASNs are from outside of the RIPE region
has been discussed recent RIPE meetings.
I asked RIR staff about this part of the text. They explained to me
that this part of the text was not intended as a restriction on
registering resources in another region. Instead, its goal was to
ensure that an RIR cannot refuse to provide service to organisations
based in a country within its own service region.
I suggested that the language could be improved and they asked me to
say so in a response to the consultation. So I did. I expect that more
comments requesting clearer language would do no harm.
Clearly other models exist for establishing uniqueness than treaty organizations, since that is the status quo.
Your assertion is that competitive RIRs would therefore be able to provide less bureaucracy and lower cost than current RIRs.
In the allocation of numbers, IPv6 blocks and ASNs are pretty easy to get, everywhere. They're also pretty cheap:
RIPE NCC APNIC AFRINIC LACNIC ARIN
IPv6 /32 2600 EUR 1000 AUD 5000 USD 2750 USD 1000 USD
ASN 2600 EUR 0 AUD 450 USD 500 USD 250 USD
(That's initial fee plus annual renewal, but there are nuances I've simplified. I'm not authoritative and could be corrected for reading their pages wrong).
When it comes to IPv4 transfers, the bureaucratic hurdle varies by region. But the potential for fraud is high, and the disruption to the Internet if fraud were to succeed at scale would be significant. (Aha! We found something operational!)
How much cost could realistically be driven out, and still have a secure, reliable database and an open policy development process?
I am aware of a couple of companies that would like to compete with the RIRs. Maybe that's what you're thinking of. So far they have been unable to convince me that they have the communities' best interests at heart.
Me too. But should one of them make a convincing argument in the
future, I'm not convinced it's a good idea for the ICP to stand in the
way.
I also worry that the ICP-2 draft speaks broadly to what the RIRs may
and may not do when it should probably only speak to what *registry
services* they can and cannot offer. It's an important distinction. As
previously mentioned, there exist things like RIPE RIS and ARIN
community grants which are not registry services and should really not
be geographically limited.
Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 09:56:27AM -0800, William Herrin:
previously mentioned, there exist things like RIPE RIS and ARIN
community grants which are not registry services and should really not
be geographically limited.
IMO, no RIR should be involved in issuing grants. Their function is
to provide number services. If they have money for grants, that is
further proof that the service fees are too high.
How much cost could realistically be driven out, and still have a secure, reliable database and an open policy development process?
I am aware of a couple of companies that would like to compete with the RIRs. Maybe that’s what you’re thinking of. So far they have been unable to convince me that they have the communities’ best interests at heart.
There is a 100% chance that a for profit entity would increase every fee that the non-profit RIRs charge today, and invent as many new fees and charges as they could possibly get away with.
Good, bad or indifferent, the RIRs are a cartel of geographic
monopolies. As we talk about what they should be tomorrow, it’s
helpful to understand what they are today.
What is, in your opinion, the perfect scenario by which the functions of the RIRs today could be structured? The ‘if I could greenfield this today’ idea?
To the extent that the ICP offers ICANN authority over the number
system, ICANN must do the same. ICANN cannot have final authority over
the establishment of new RIRs should it come to operate in a
jurisdiction whose governance would restrict recognition. I
respectfully point out that he who shall not be named has made
numerous campaign promises about changes to the system of law under
which ICANN operates. The threat is not imminent, but it’s there.
Can you point to a specific legislative proposal, action, or legal cases/filings that could lead to :
Grant the power to force a state registered public benefit corporation to enter a legal agreement with the US federal government?
Grant the federal government the authority to direct the actions of a state registered public benefit corporation?
I don’t recall the exact code reference or name of the law (something like production act), but there is US law on the books that allows a company to be compelled to produce for the federal government essentially by presidential executive order.
Further, any court willing to issue such an order would meet your test number 2. Given that the current Supreme Court has more in common with a random number generator than a court of law, I would hesitate to count on their judgment.
Sun, Nov 17, 2024 at 12:48:04PM -0800, William Herrin:
I’m not convinced that the service regions should be limited by the ICP to non-overlapping geographic territories.
While geographic monopolies may have made sense in the past, it is unclear to me how/why they make sense today (unless the point is to create/perpetuate a cartel).
I am curious as to what you mean by create/perpetuate a cartel?
A group of geographical monopolies who between them have total control
over what the essential service costs and whether anybody else can
perform it. It might as well be the definition of a cartel.
And, to the extent that the service provider must excel.
Competition is healthy for all enterprise.
The registries are more than just an enterprise boss.
They really aren’t. Contrary to the theories you keep pushing, they are businesses. They are not state agencies or quasi state agencies. They are not granted enforcement powers or any extraordinary legislative or judicial powers. They are run of the mill not-for-profit businesses.
The RIRs each have a geographic monopoly and at their creation, this is required by ICP-2 (the original). This has nothing to do with where you land on any of your subsequent questions. The NRO cartel has agreed to specific territories served by each RIR, granting each a geographic monopoly. Because organizations served by RIRs are not constrained by those boundaries, many operate in more than one region and the rules get fuzzy, but in general, territorial exclusivity is long established.
I’m not saying this is good or bad. I see benefits to it, but I also see reasons it might be better to phase it out.
In any case, it might be worth considering granting a certain right of a registrant to transfer the servicing of their registration to the RIR of their choosing.
They'd look more or less like they do today. Rough spots aside, four
of the five are working pretty well.
Most of the changes I would make to the RIRs are small ones. For
example, there are instances of product tying at ARIN which I think
should be eliminated. The contract for RPKI service is tied to having
a contract for address registration service. This is unnecessary and
in my view, counterproductive. A consumer of ARIN RPKI service must be
able to demonstrate lawful possession of the associated address block,
but that shouldn't require holding an ARIN contract for registration
of the same address block.
There are larger changes I would consider, but nothing I would definitely do.
Sometimes the right thing to do and the legally safe thing to do are
not the same. The ARIN RPKI TAL should be available on an as-is basis.
It's not. ARIN stopped demanding a signed contract, but they still
assert that you're bound to a non-trivial contract as a consequence of
using it. Counsel tells us offering it as-is creates a legal risk for
the entire organization. Which impacts the registration services. The
right answer might be forking off a separate corporate entity to
implement RPKI so that they can do the right thing while only creating
legal risk in their specific environment.
For another example, there's a tension between the exigencies of
operating a modern registry and the obligations to so-called legacy
registrants taken on at the dawn of the commercial Internet. One
possible relief would be to fork off a legacy registry and let it
operate its own governance applicable only to those legacy
registrations. Such a registry would inherently overlap the geography
of the others.
Sun, Nov 17, 2024 at 12:48:04PM -0800, William Herrin:
I’m not convinced that the service regions should be limited by the ICP to non-overlapping geographic territories.
While geographic monopolies may have made sense in the past, it is unclear to me how/why they make sense today (unless the point is to create/perpetuate a cartel).
I am curious as to what you mean by create/perpetuate a cartel?
A group of geographical monopolies who between them have total control
over what the essential service costs and whether anybody else can
perform it. It might as well be the definition of a cartel.
And, to the extent that the service provider must excel.
Competition is healthy for all enterprise.
The registries are more than just an enterprise boss.
They really aren’t. Contrary to the theories you keep pushing, they are businesses. They are not state agencies or quasi state agencies. They are not granted enforcement powers or any extraordinary legislative or judicial powers. They are run of the mill not-for-profit businesses.
Your theory here is nonsense. Can you perhaps think before you respond on some issues.
A business has private or public shareholders or stockholders who once all taxes have been deducted on the legal entity’s annual revenue or bottomline … the stockholders then enjoys dividends through board resolutions.
Can you share any such proof or fillings that any of the RIR have shareholders and those shareholders distribute dividends or payouts annually to the RIR stockholders?
“It is great to see so much interest and discussion about the ICP-2 review. Please be aware that the ASO AC will only be processing the feedback received through the questionnaire - https://ripe-ncc.typeform.com/icp-2?typeform-source=www.arin.net. Be sure to share your feedback through the questionnaire for formal consideration.”
Just providing for your information in case you wish to have your feedback captured and considered by the ASO AC.
If the ASO AC wants community input and participation the process
they've picked is, respectfully, entirely wrong. Ideas need discussion
and debate to germinate and questionnaires fail to capture answers to
questions the author didn't think to ask.
But since you asked nicely, I'll offer that feedback via the questionnaire.
The RIRs each have a geographic monopoly and at their creation, this is required by ICP-2 (the original). This has nothing to do with where you land on any of your subsequent questions.
Are the European Union or African Union, geographic monopolies?
The NRO cartel has agreed to specific territories served by each RIR, granting each a geographic monopoly.
You write as if a couple of guys formed an organization and decided how the system must work.
FWIW, the RIRs (NRO) are an outcome of wider internet community engagents that lasted years if not decade for which you historically particpated in as a member of the said communities. Most of the rules of engagent were decided through wider consultations at policy debates and some by those elected by various internet communities.
Do not confuse the RIR/NRO system with the pseudo-private enterprises operated by sole propriators who believe that they can change a system that has served the public so well for decades and continue to do so.
Because organizations served by RIRs are not constrained by those boundaries, many operate in more than one region and the rules get fuzzy, but in general, territorial exclusivity is long established.
And countries do have some embassies in different other countries.
I’m not saying this is good or bad. I see benefits to it, but I also see reasons it might be better to phase it out.
In any case, it might be worth considering granting a certain right of a registrant to transfer the servicing of their registration to the RIR of their choosing.
Each region has its own rules of engagement. When such registrant decides to play in a certain service region, they must comply with existing rules of the game in the said region.
You are correct that a non-profit organization does not have owners
and thus does not produce profits for distribution to owners. Instead,
it has a board of directors with a legal duty to assure it operates
consistent with its non-profit mission.
Owen is correct that in every other respect, a non-profit organization
functions like any ordinary business.
They really aren’t. Contrary to the theories you keep pushing, they are
businesses. They are not state agencies or quasi state agencies.
They are not granted enforcement powers or any extraordinary
legislative or judicial powers. They are run of the mill not-for-profit businesses.
A business has private or public shareholders or stockholders who
once all taxes have been deducted on the legal entity’s annual revenue
or bottomline … the stockholders then enjoys dividends through board resolutions.
Noah,
You are correct that a non-profit organization does not have owners
and thus does not produce profits for distribution to owners. Instead,
it has a board of directors with a legal duty to assure it operates
consistent with its non-profit mission.
Indeed…
Owen is correct that in every other respect, a non-profit organization
functions like any ordinary business.
Bill,
For the purposes of regulatory compliances, an NGO ought to ensure it meets its statutory liabilies just like any legal entity.
However, referring to the RIRs system as a cartel is misleading. We are choosing to throw the word cartel around as if the RIR lack accountability and operate without oversight yet we all here are members of such RIRs and we as a community have participated in the policy development processes that bore the rules of engagement for which the RIR system have operated-in for decades.
The administrators or if you will staff/employees of these RIR’s run them based on bylaws/constitutions that resource members have enacted. The policies each RIR follows to manage number resources in each region came to be through community consensus through the policy development processes that are open to public participation.
How then can some of you claim that the RIRs are some sort of cartel.
Are we saying that we the resource members who agreed on a constitutions for managing these organizations and go on to bankroll the systems through membership fees together with the wider internet communities who decide on the rules of engagement through the PDP, created cartels organizations in concert through our collective actions?
It sounds to me then that you don’t really have much of an issue with the RIR system generally then, but your concerns are more centered on one specific RIR.
Sorry, no. The question was about guiding principles for an updated
ICP between the RIRs. That's what I responded to: improvements to that
document not "concerns" about individual RIRs.
You also requested a tangent about detail-level changes I might make
to the RIRs themselves, so I offered some ideas born from my direct
experience. Sorry that confused you.