In October 2023, the Number Resource Organization initiated a process to undertake a significant update to Internet Coordination Policy 2 (ICP-2); the policy which specifies the criteria for establishing new Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). The Address Supporting Organization Address Council (ASO AC) has been tasked with managing the revision process, emphasizing community engagement and transparency.
The ASO AC is actively seeking feedback from the Internet number resource community and the broader internet community on these proposed principles. At this stage, comments are being solicited on the principles themselves, rather than specific amendments to the text of the document. This collaborative approach aims to refine the principles before drafting a revised version of ICP-2 for further stakeholder input. To facilitate community engagement, there is a questionnaire seeking feedback that available in multiple languages, including English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese. The questionnaire is designed to gather diverse perspectives and can be completed in approximately 7–10 minutes.
Recognizing the importance of comprehensive community input, the deadline for input has via the questionnaire has been extended to 6 December 2024.
1. The proposed principles fail to speak to one of the issues debated
on NANOG this week, specifically jurisdictional resistance to
political sanction. It seems to me that an RIR should be expected to
locate itself in a legal jurisdiction where they're unlikely to be
ordered to alter service that is within their territory but outside of
that legal jurisdiction. Moreover, it seems to me that they should
routinely monitor the local and regional legal environments and
maintain contingency plans for relocation in the event of adverse
changes.
To the extent that the ICP offers ICANN authority over the number
system, ICANN must do the same. ICANN cannot have final authority over
the establishment of new RIRs should it come to operate in a
jurisdiction whose governance would restrict recognition. I
respectfully point out that he who shall not be named has made
numerous campaign promises about changes to the system of law under
which ICANN operates. The threat is not imminent, but it's there.
2. I'm not convinced that the service regions should be limited by the
ICP to non-overlapping geographic territories. Although I generally
favor geographic restriction as a matter of practice, perhaps it would
be better to require unanimous assent to permit an RIR to operate with
an overlapping territory. If the ICP does adopt the rule, it should
apply only to number registration and should not restrict the RIRs
from offering other services on a global basis.
For example, RIPE RIS is not geographically bound and would be of
little utility if it was. Nor was the ARIN policy and actions
authorizing the release of IPv4 address space for RFC 6598
geographically bound.
It seems to me that an RIR should be expected to locate itself in a legal jurisdiction where they're unlikely to be ordered to alter service that is within their territory but outside of that legal jurisdiction.
Depending on what you mean by “alter service that is within their territory but outside of that legal jurisdiction”, while it might be possible to identify such a jurisdiction now (I’m unable to think of one off hand, certainly not the US), “Past results are no guarantee of future performance” and a side effect of regulation/legal action can be to limit the ability of the RIR to counter that action.
Moreover, it seems to me that they should routinely monitor the local and regional legal environments and maintain contingency plans for relocation in the event of adverse changes.
Having long ago had some experience relocating a (much, much smaller) RIR from one legal jurisdiction to another, this would be a non-trivial undertaking with significant cost and implying a high level of disruption, both to the community the RIR serves as well as its staff. Pragmatically speaking, I’m skeptical either the RIRs or their members would view the benefits outweighing the costs/risks. That is, if (say) there was a court order in the US that required ARIN to invalidate a particular block of addresses, I’m skeptical ARIN and its staff would pull up stakes and move to another country or that the ARIN membership would be inclined to demand such a move.
To the extent that the ICP offers ICANN authority over the number system, ICANN must do the same.
I suspect this is a bit outside the scope of the current effort.
2. I'm not convinced that the service regions should be limited by the ICP to non-overlapping geographic territories.
While geographic monopolies may have made sense in the past, it is unclear to me how/why they make sense today (unless the point is to create/perpetuate a cartel).
> It seems to me that an RIR should be expected to locate itself in a legal jurisdiction where they're unlikely to be ordered to alter service that is within their territory but outside of that legal jurisdiction.
> Moreover, it seems to me that they should routinely monitor the local and regional legal environments and maintain contingency plans for relocation in the event of adverse changes.
Having long ago had some experience relocating a (much, much smaller)
RIR from one legal jurisdiction to another, this would be a non-trivial
undertaking with significant cost and implying a high level of disruption,
Hi David,
Hence the need for _contingency planning_ performed under no time
pressure far in advance of any action. And since no jurisdiction is
immune, that contingency planning includes figuring out how much
interference is enough that the trigger should be pulled on executing
the plan. You figure these things out in advance so that when the
pressure is on there's no need for hand-wringing; you just follow the
plan.
Really, it's just another part of the disaster recovery planning. A
different failure mode that requires recovery.
> To the extent that the ICP offers ICANN authority over the number system, ICANN must do the same.
I suspect this is a bit outside the scope of the current effort.
Under proposed principles - governance - authority, the draft says,
"ICANN shall have final authority to..."
So long as ICANN is meant to hold the final authority in any matter
relevant to the RIR system, the question of external interference in
ICANN operations is in scope for the effort.
While geographic monopolies may have made sense in the past, it is unclear to me how/why they make sense today (unless the point is to create/perpetuate a cartel).
They discourage forum shopping. Forum shopping tends to cause a race
to the bottom. It's unhealthy.
A group of geographical monopolies who between them have total control
over what the essential service costs and whether anybody else can
perform it. It might as well be the definition of a cartel.
To the extent that the ICP offers ICANN authority over the number
system, ICANN must do the same. ICANN cannot have final authority over
the establishment of new RIRs should it come to operate in a
jurisdiction whose governance would restrict recognition. I
respectfully point out that he who shall not be named has made
numerous campaign promises about changes to the system of law under
which ICANN operates. The threat is not imminent, but it’s there.
Can you point to a specific legislative proposal, action, or legal cases/filings that could lead to :
Grant the power to force a state registered public benefit corporation to enter a legal agreement with the US federal government?
Grant the federal government the authority to direct the actions of a state registered public benefit corporation?
In the absence of either , I strongly dispute there is a ‘threat’ , imminent or otherwise.
That doesn’t make sense. Are we trying to imply that the RIR’s are a geographic monopoly?
What makes an RIR? Is it, its administrators/managers of the registry or is it, its resource members and other stakeholders?
Every system has its own modus operandi. Last I checked, they are member based and rules of engagement are set by the members. If members want change in price, there is a process. One of which includes change of leadership with new mandate such as review of pricing etc.
Sun, Nov 17, 2024 at 12:48:04PM -0800, William Herrin:
I’m not convinced that the service regions should be limited by the ICP to non-overlapping geographic territories.
While geographic monopolies may have made sense in the past, it is unclear to me how/why they make sense today (unless the point is to create/perpetuate a cartel).
I am curious as to what you mean by create/perpetuate a cartel?
A group of geographical monopolies who between them have total control
over what the essential service costs and whether anybody else can
perform it. It might as well be the definition of a cartel.
And, to the extent that the service provider must excel.
Competition is healthy for all enterprise.
The registries are more than just an enterprise boss.
I "imply" nothing. If you read the document John referenced, Proposed ICP-2 Version 2 Principles | The Number Resource Organization,
it explicitly says, "The Region for which an RIR is responsible shall
cover a large multinational geographic area and shall not overlap with
that of another RIR."
In the same way that phone numbers or radio frequencies are allocated by geographical monopolies, yes.
Except that the RIRs are *much* more open to participation.
And you don't have to get addresses from RIRs; you can get them from NIRs in some cases, or LIRs everywhere.
Good, bad or indifferent, the RIRs are a cartel of geographic
monopolies. As we talk about what they should be tomorrow, it's
helpful to understand what they are today.
They do not meet the dictionary definition of "cartel."
1: a written agreement between belligerent nations
2: a combination of independent commercial or industrial enterprises designed to limit competition or fix prices
3: a combination of political groups for common action
"Cartel" is a pretty pejorative term to apply to non-profit organizations providing a coordination service (ensuring uniqueness).
Probably also time to note some of NANOG's list guidelines:
1. Posts to NANOG’s Mailing List should be focused on operational and technical content only, as described by the NANOG Bylaws.
8. Posts of a political, philosophical, or legal nature are prohibited.
They do not meet the dictionary definition of "cartel."
2: a combination of independent commercial enterprises designed to limit competition
You have to pick nits about whether a non-profit is a commercial
enterprise to decide the RIRs don't fit this definition.
"Cartel" is a pretty pejorative term
Then no one will mistake it as sugar-coating the situation. You put
the thing in its worst possible light and if it still looks good it
probably is good. If it doesn't, maybe it should get another look.
In the same way that phone numbers or radio frequencies are allocated by geographical monopolies, yes.
Except that the RIRs are *much* more open to participation.
And except that telephone numbers and radio frequencies are allocated/managed by nation-states under UN-based international treaty regimes. I’m not sure this is a particularly good model to follow.
What problem are you trying to solve?
As I suspect you’re aware, pragmatically, the geographical monopoly restrictions imposed by the RFCs/ICP-2 are increasingly bypassed, resulting in those restrictions arguably merely adding unnecessary bureaucracy/cost. The question is, when considering revising the policies under which the RIR operate, whether or not perpetuating those restrictions is beneficial in the long run.