Using unallocated address space

could someone please explain the benefit of turning the registries into
internet police forces?

Cool, speeding tickets for people with 10Gbps links in production today.

We don't need a "police force" per se as much as a functionary who, on
behalf of the paying membership of the registry, tries to establish
(e.g., with a phone call! or some email!) whether the announcement
is a question of simple, honest misconfiguration or misunderstanding,
or whether it's deliberate. Moreover, with another couple of
phone calls (or email), a deliberately bad announcer can talk with
the network(s) immediately upstream from a deliberate bad-announcer
and suggest that the membership as a whole would appreciate the
installation of strict filters against the bad announcer.

If that produces no results, rat out the source and its immediate
upstreams to the whole membership.

and the offending party will announce 32 /23s.. what will this solve?

Great, so we know that the offending party is not only deliberately
announcing bogus data into the routing system, but actually _disrupting_
it. This is what real-life police are for.

  Sean.

Cool, speeding tickets for people with 10Gbps links in production today.

"if you route, don't drink. if you drink, don't route."

We don't need a "police force" per se as much as a functionary who, on
behalf of the paying membership of the registry, tries to establish
(e.g., with a phone call! or some email!) whether the announcement
is a question of simple, honest misconfiguration or misunderstanding,
or whether it's deliberate. Moreover, with another couple of
phone calls (or email), a deliberately bad announcer can talk with
the network(s) immediately upstream from a deliberate bad-announcer
and suggest that the membership as a whole would appreciate the
installation of strict filters against the bad announcer.

i agree that a setup as described here could have it's place.. i'm warning
against the "hang `em high" attitude that was being proposed in earlier
posts... that isn't to say i don't still have misgivings about such a
system, just that your proposal seems much more sane.

some sort of education and intervention system makes more sense than
a blackhole for any perceived offense approach...

If that produces no results, rat out the source and its immediate
upstreams to the whole membership.

> and the offending party will announce 32 /23s.. what will this solve?

Great, so we know that the offending party is not only deliberately
announcing bogus data into the routing system, but actually _disrupting_
it. This is what real-life police are for.

perhaps this example was a little disingenuous on my part.. perhaps a
better example would be: what happens when people just announce 32 /23s
instead of 2 /19s to make it harder to blackhole... indeed, if people
are announcing the /23s right off the bat, it's harder to prove that
they are being malicious(tho it might not be as hard to prove that
they're idiots :-)..

  Sean.

In principle this is a good idea. However I suspect that the effort involved
in getting to the right people at the announcing AS and/or their up-stream
peers is "not negligible". So this can easily become a serious effort.

i agree, as the "right people" in this case would not only have to be good
network engineers, but also good at communicating with others AND relatively
immune to politics....

As a person somehow connected to the registry system :wink: I would be interested
to hear privately from ISPs whether they would like such a service and
-more importantly- whether they would be prepared to put procedures in place
by which the registries can reliably reach knowledgeable routing engineers
that have the task of tracking down such problems as well as the resources and
authority to do so.

i think for something like this to work well, it would have to be somewhat
separate from the individual registries...

Daniel

michael