Tightened DNS security question re: DNS amplification attacks.

The bad guys want amplification but will take obscuring
  if that's all they can get.

  RD=1 is only the signature of the current attack.

  RD=0 is equally viable.

  Can you cope with "RD=0 NS ." directed to the root servers
  from forged addresses? This is exactly the query name
  servers use to prime their caches with.

  Stop trying to figure out how to stop the attack of the day
  as it really is a waste of time and start trying to figure
  out how to get near universal BCP 38 deployment.

  Let the world know you are a good you if are deploying BCP

  Put up on your front web page what percentage of address
  space / links are convered by BCP 38 compliance, where
  compliance is defined as "traffic sourced from a arbitary
  address will not be passed". This should be auditable.