From: "Erik E. Fair" (Internet Architect) <email@example.com>
Perhaps the easy way out is to suggest that educating the ISPs as to
what constitutes good behavior at an exchange (routing system stability
and reliable packet delivery) is the responsibility of the exchange
This is not just the easy way out, I believe that it is the only way out.
Then, we don't have the problem of all those multiple peering
agreements. Instead, just one with the exchange.
Also, this eliminates the problem of each ISP trying to "filter" bogus
routes. Instead, the exchange operators will handle that problem.
Indeed, I think that this is/was a major impetus for "policy-based"
routing in the first place (reading the old RFCs), and a clear reason we
need the Routing Arbiter!
and it might even be possible to enforce some interesting
policies in that regard in the route servers (e.g. if you have more
than N routing or BGP peer transitions per time period, the route
server will refuse to peer with you for 48 hours - think of it as the
hold-down or damper from Hell).
I certainly think that to the extent that the exchange operators can
measure such things as routing and peer stability, it is in everyone's
interest to see the numbers (except those ISPs who are unstable). Who
knows? A series good reports from exchange operators about an ISP might
lead to offers of private peering arrangements outside of the exchange,
to the benefit of the ISP. Similar to the way that having a good credit
record seems to lead to endless offers of more credit.
I understood that the RA contract provided for these measurements, and
agree that they would be a good thing!
Key fingerprint = 17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26 DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32
Key fingerprint = 2E 07 23 03 C5 62 70 D3 59 B1 4F 5E 1D C2 C1 A2