In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can.
Inferred improvements during Sep 2023:
none inferred
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Sep 2023:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
3356 LEVEL3 2016-03-06 2023-09-11
209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2023-09-24
20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2023-09-30
25787 ROWE-NETWORKS 2016-10-21 2023-09-30
11427 TWC-11427-TEXAS 2016-10-21 2023-09-26
10796 TWC-10796-MIDWEST 2016-10-24 2023-09-27
271 BCNET 2016-10-24 2023-09-23
852 ASN852 2017-04-16 2023-09-01
701 UUNET 2017-06-14 2023-09-29
18798 ENCORE-ASN 2017-10-09 2023-09-19
55016 IMPER-AS-1 2021-05-18 2023-09-26
46997 2021-12-22 2023-09-28
394414 E2WS 2022-05-08 2023-09-28
400517 2022-10-03 2023-09-27
12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2023-09-27
41378 KirinoNET 2023-03-23 2023-09-29
3701 NERONET 2023-04-18 2023-09-27
400282 2023-04-27 2023-09-29
13693 NTS-ONLINE 2023-05-05 2023-09-02
46690 SNET-FCC 2023-05-20 2023-09-30
36687 WILINE 2023-08-02 2023-09-04
16557 COLOSOLUTIONS 2023-09-09 2023-09-12
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org