In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can.
Inferred improvements during Mar 2024:
ASN Name Fixed-By
11055 MIDCONTINENT-COMMUNICATIONS 2024-03-01
394195 CLEARNETWORX 2024-03-29
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Mar 2024:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
3356 LEVEL3 2016-03-06 2024-03-02
209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2024-03-29
27364 ACS-INTERNET 2016-09-27 2024-03-26
20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2024-03-30
46573 GLOBAL-FRAG-NETWORKS 2019-05-16 2024-03-29
46997 2021-12-22 2024-03-29
12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2024-03-29
3701 NERONET 2023-04-18 2024-03-29
400282 2023-04-27 2024-03-28
202400 2023-05-08 2024-03-31
394684 WISPERNET 2024-01-17 2024-03-28
55 UPENN 2024-01-30 2024-03-22
25853 ELJY30540 2024-02-01 2024-03-26
27425 ASN-IDK-27425 2024-02-21 2024-03-23
54256 STONE-RLM-AZER 2024-02-22 2024-03-11
33544 WILINE 2024-03-28 2024-03-28
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org