Thus, removing a certificate or ROA *does NOT* result in an RPKI INVALID
route announcement; the result is RPKI UNKNOWN.
Which is fine until UNKNOWNs are no longer permitted, a logical next
step. It may not apply globally, initially perhaps just a US anti
terrorist measure requiring all networks in the USA do it.
The only way a court order could make a route announcement get the
RPKI status *INVALID* would be to:
1: Remove the original, legitimate ROA
2: Tamper with the Registry, inject a false ROA authorizing another
AS to make the announcement look like a hijack
Domains already get FBI hijacked so this seems plausible too.
All in all, for an RPKI-specific court order to be effective in
taking a network offline, the RIR would have to tamper with the
registry, inject false data and try to make sure it's not detected so
nobody applies a local override.
Doesn't need to be undetected, more likely it'll be quite overt
and have a big don't mess FBI entry in the RIR similar to