routes to hit 50,000 soon? or filter AS 7007....

Mailman List Mirror (Read Only)
1

sorry if someone thinks this is the wrong message for the group, but it does
effect us all...

we are seeing lots of routes coming in

sho ip bgp sum
BGP table version is 6699646, main routing table version 6699646
49793 network entries (94886/99644 paths) using 8897576 bytes of memory
11894 BGP path attribute entries using 1541824 bytes of memory

but the routes seem to be coming from AS 7007... They are advertising many
routes, even our own. Sorry, but email and phones to them isn't working.

*> 156.5.0.0 137.39.167.29 50 701 701 701 1239
1790 7007 ?
* 208.131.13.29 0 5650 6176 1239 1790
7007 ?
*> 167.32.0.0 137.39.167.29 50 701 701 701 1239
1790 7007 ?
* 208.131.13.29 50 5650 3561 3561 1239
1790 7007 ?
*> 192.56.218.0 137.39.167.29 0 701 701 701 3561
194 3909 1 1239 17
90 7007 ?
*> 192.72.0.0 137.39.167.29 50 701 701 701 1239
1790 7007 ?
* 208.131.13.29 50 5650 3561 3561 1239
1790 7007 ?
*> 192.73.26.0 137.39.167.29 50 701 701 701 1239
1790 7007 ?
* 208.131.13.29 50 5650 3561 3561 1239
1790 7007 ?
*> 192.73.28.0 137.39.167.29 50 701 701 701 1239
1790 7007 ?
* 208.131.13.29 50 5650 3561 3561 1239
1790 7007 ?
*> 192.76.170.0 137.39.167.29 50 701 701 701 1239
1790 7007 ?
* 208.131.13.29 0 5650 6176 1239 1790
7007 ?
* 192.83.0.0 208.131.13.29 0 5650 6176 1239 1790
7007 ?
*> 137.39.167.29 50 701 701 701 1239
1790 7007 ?
* 192.83.64.0 208.131.13.29 0 5650 6176 1239 1790
7007 ?

whois 156.5.0.0
Unilever (NET-UNILEVER2)
   Sprint International

Christian

2

AS7007 has a 1 800 number 1 800 918-0524

I cant get an answer

They started advertising more secific routes for our CIDR block at
approx 7:45 PDT.

They are connected to Sprintlink.

Could someone pull the pug on these guys.

Oh yes they also seem to be advertising a route for rs.internic.net
so it took me a while to find them.

John B.

3

I have now filterd all routes from 7007

ip as-path access-list 1 deny _7007$

This filter will remain in effect untill we get an explanation and
appology from 7007.

There noc clams to be working on the problem.
Not good enough.

I think that everyone shoud filter them untill we get an exexplanation.

John Bradley
AS6539

4

How about sending them a bill for all the time we've spent on fixing this
problem? The fact that it may not have been intended is not relevant to
whether they are liable for the damage they've caused. I can see a nice
$2000 bill just from the time I and my employees have spent fixing the
problem and notifying customers.

Pete Kruckenberg
pete@inquo.net

5

Unless Sprint (AS 1790) filters at the source (or simply shutdown the
interface), we will remain in troubled waters.

6

==>On Fri, 25 Apr 1997, System Administrator wrote:
==>
==>> I have now filterd all routes from 7007
==>>
==>> ip as-path access-list 1 deny _7007$
==>>
==>>
==>> This filter will remain in effect untill we get an explanation and
==>> appology from 7007.
==>>
==>> There noc clams to be working on the problem.
==>> Not good enough.
==>>
==>> I think that everyone shoud filter them untill we get an exexplanation.
==>
==>Unless Sprint (AS 1790) filters at the source (or simply shutdown the
==>interface), we will remain in troubled waters.

When I called mai.net, they mentioned that they had unplugged their
mae-east connection as well as turned down their Sprint DS-3's until the
source of the problem could be identified.

/cah

7

Perhaps the more pertinent question is why AS7007's downstream provider
didn't filter on AS7007's routes.

    -Steve