You may or may not think Verisign as registry is blameless / disreputable
and to blame for this incident.
There is causation for incoherence between the authoritative and
non-authoritative nameservers for a particular data set.
You may or may not think the gaining/losing registrars are blameless /
disreputable for this incident.
There is causation for provisioning state change triggers to the database
used to construct a particular data set published by the authoritative
nameservers for that particular data set.
Tou may or may not think that ICANN gTLD policy is blameless / disreputable
for this incident.
There is causation for policy and mechanism that is articulated in end-to-end
transactions between registrants, intermediate entities, and registries.
These are not mutually exclusive. Blame and repute are secondary to the
correct reconstructions of causations.