It occurs to me that Yahoo's deployment of DMARC p=reject, and the choice of several big mail operators to honor that, has created a situation not unlike a really routing table or nameserver, snafu --- someone's published information that's caused lots of things to break. At an operational level, this comes down to Yahoo publishing a DMARC record into their nameservers containing "p=reject." As a result, Yahoo, and several other very large mail systems, are bouncing huge amounts of mail.
We see, and react to, routing and nameserver snafus all the time. The response is usually an immediate, cooperative response to fix the problem as quickly as possible. Sometimes an operational problem uncovers a software bug, or vulnerability, or a protocol failure mode - which triggers various responses (CERT alert, software patches, protocol revisions via the IETF).
Running a mail system and providing some hosting and list services, most of the operational issues I've run into involve nameserver corruption, over-aggressive spam blockers (and, of course, ongoing barrages of spam and persistent cracking threats). In most cases, problems are easy to resolve, and all involved are cooeprative (if sometimes slow). About the closest analogy I've encountered, to the current situation, are the more aggressive of the anti-spam blocklists (remember when someone would an entire subnet, with intent, when one host on that subnet generated some spam, or the operators who would extort payment for "expedited removal?"). By and large, market pressure has largely driven the worst actors into oblivion - but there don't seem to be any measures, with teeth, for dealing with bad actors.
It strikes me that this situation is analogous:
- several very big players have put a protocol into production that is, charitably, immature (DMARC is an informational internet-draft, not even an RFC, much less a standards-track RFC - and its backers have pretty much ignored any input from mailing list operators)
- Yahoo published a dns record that triggers a protocol mode that results in huge amounts of mail bounces and operational disruption.
- Yahoo (operationally) and the DMARC authors are intentionally un-responsive (as are hotmail, comcast, a few others; gmail, I note is not bouncing mail)
How do we respond as operators, beyond late-night, ad-hoc patches to list software, that only partially resolve the problem?
What kind of responses are available? In the broader scope of things, what kinds of responses are typical if someone publishes corrupted information and then doesn't cooperate in fixing the situation - be that through obliviousness, incompetence, lack of resources, laziness, or active intent (criminal or not)?