Dear operators,
FORTH's INSPIRE group and CAIDA are delighted to announce the public release of the ARTEMIS BGP prefix hijacking detection tool, available as open-source software at https://github.com/FORTH-ICS-INSPIRE/artemis
ARTEMIS is designed to be operated by an AS in order to monitor BGP for potential hijacking attempts against its own prefixes. The system detects such attacks within seconds, enabling immediate mitigation. The current release has been tested at a major greek ISP, a dual-homed edge academic network, and a major US R&E backbone network.
We would be happy if you'd give it a try and provide feedback. Feel free to make pull requests on GitHub and help us make this a true community project.
ARTEMIS is funded by European Research Council (ERC) grant agreement no. 338402 (NetVolution Project), the RIPE NCC Community Projects 2017, the Comcast Innovation Fund, US NSF grants OAC-1848641 and CNS-1423659 and US DHS S&T contract HHSP233201600012C.
Best regards,
Vasileios
Hi Vasileios,
Congratulations of building this.
Wanted to try it out as a VM but frankly...
The "docker" part put me off...
M.
Hello,
it is quite easy to install on a VM, you will not need special infrastructure,
but only two pieces of software to be able to run lightweight containers
(docker-ce and docker-compose).
In fact, this is how we test it ourselves :).
We will consider publishing a standalone VM is this helps testing more (details
to come in the project's' wiki pages).
Best,
Vasileios
I'm curious, If the highjacked prefix is a /24 (subset of your much larger /22) and you can only tie the highjacked prefix, at that point how effective is the mitigation outside of a default bgp route selection process?
Folks have studied announcing a /25 etc.. and it can help because many providers will accept them.. it won’t get everyone, but longer than /24 prefixes do help.
- Jared
Exactly for this case, besides what Jared mentioned, there is the possibility of using a third party mitigation service. This service can be provided by e.g., a DDoS protection provider since it requires announcing the exact /24 (or other prefix) from another AS which can attract and tunnel the traffic back to the victim. This is very close to current practices in the context of DDoS mitigation; the context is different however the underlying mechanisms are similar. For more details on the effectiveness of this strategy, please refer to Section 6.2.2 of our ToN paper (available at
https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.01085).
The current tool offers real time detection, with such mitigation mechanisms being under investigation.
Best regards,
Vasileios
So expect now BGP hijackers to announce /25s from here on in. They generally adopt BCPs faster than providers.
-Hank