Re: On consistency and 192.0.0.0/24

Mailman List Mirror (Read Only)
1

RFC 5736 was obsoleted by RFC 6890.

It says in part:

2.2.1. Information Requirements

The IPv4 and IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registries maintain the

following information regarding each entry:

…

o Forwardable - A boolean value indicating whether a router may

forward an IP datagram whose destination address is drawn from the

allocated special-purpose address block between external

interfaces.

…

That means that some IP addresses in the block 192.0.0.0/24 may be routable.

So, I would not make this a bogon.

A better way to filter IP routes is by policy, for example based upon

IRR and RPKI records.

2

That means that some IP addresses in the block 192.0.0.0/24 may be routable.

So, I would not make this a bogon.

This ignores note 2 on the IANA definitions page, next to 192.0.0.0/24 :

[2] |

<br>Not useable unless by virtue of a more specific reservation.<br>

|

  • | - |

Which then lists the more specific reservations, of which SOME are forwardable , and some are not.

The categorization as ‘bogon’ or not would really be determined by individual operator use cases, and where/how such a bogon filter is applied.

3

From what I looked at IANA Special Registry, this whole range looks
like some service IPs. I mean, they provide specific service within AS.
From me then, it looks like bogon. You should not receive routing for those
addresses from other AS. (PNI is out of scope here).

4

It feels like people are talking past each other when they are saying “routable” — these are fairly clearly not routable on the Global Internet, but addresses like 192.0.0.10/32 (the TURN anycast address) look like they are intended to be routed within a network:

"IP anycast can also be used for TURN service discovery. A packet

sent to an anycast address is delivered to the "topologically

nearest" network interface with the anycast address."

but this is clearly not supposed to leak:

"In a network without any TURN server that is aware of the TURN

anycast address, outgoing TURN requests could leak out onto the

external Internet, possibly revealing information.

Using an IANA-assigned well-known TURN anycast address enables border

gateways to block such outgoing packets. In the default-free zone,

routers should be configured to drop such packets."

W