RE: Collocation Access

What I've never understood is, that, how a gov't issue ID (for the
purposes of allowing entry) is of any use whatsoever.

It's not as if someone is doing a instand background check to know if
the person is a criminal, or wanted, or whatever. It's trivial to forge
a gov't ID.

Welcome to token security. There's lots of silly procedures around now
that add nothing to security but someone in an office dreamt them up as
they have to be seen to be doing something. If you point out how
dumb they are you're a terrorist too. So we al waste time following them
(they can't reduce them as if something did happen they'd be blamed,
who wants less security?)

Colos full of rent-a-cops are just as bad, my passport says
who I'm allowed to surrender it to and that doesn't include colo
guards yet some want to retain it whilst you're on site. Company
ID isn't acceptable to some of them either. I'd rather not trust
them with either though I don't mind them looking.

brandon

In article <200610231743.SAA23525@sunf10.rd.bbc.co.uk>, Brandon Butterworth <brandon@rd.bbc.co.uk> writes

my passport says who I'm allowed to surrender it to and that doesn't include colo guards yet some want to retain it whilst you're on site

"should not be passed to an unauthorised person" [1], which raises the issue of who authorises who (and back to my idea for accrediting colo security guards).

On the other hand there are many countries [even inside the EU] where a hotel receptionist will insist on holding your passport overnight so you can be registered with the police. Who authorised them, rather than gave them an obligation?

[1] US passports don't contain a similar clause.