I agree that core stability is of utmost importance, but by randomly and
somewhat unilaterally denying prefixes without verification of the
validity of their origin...Hmm, lets see...AS 1 sending the 4.0.0.0
netblock across a direct peering point, but it get's nicked because of
max-prefix, so it comes across through a multihomed downstream and all
of a sudden, sorry little multihomed downstream is carrying 200 Megs of
BBN transit. Oops!
I would think that the only thing that this command protects is routers
with slim memory profiles. Core routers should let the BGP decision
process clean the routes, although I do get scared when 10,000 new
routes appear over the weekend. After this weekends fiasco, I can see
your reasons, though. Maybe RSNG is useful after all...
Chris