RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques

How many thousands of "polls" do you think a looking glass can handle
simultaneously? I am all for the doomsday scenarios, but lets
make them a
little bit less sci-fi, shall we? How about "it would create
valid looking
OSPF packets with garbage in them?" or "create valid looking
STP packets"

It was just a suggestion. I don't think it's plausible on a wide scale, but
only a few queries would be needed to get an overview of the topology.
Originally I was thinking traceroutes. It's not going to be exact, but it's
going to glean enough information to cause more damage than without that
info.

If you were doing some sort of p2p, each host would simply need to perform
many random traceroutes and correlate their data. The devices that appeared
most often in that data would obviously be backbone routers, and the attack
would start with those and work to the least frequent (with specific
emphasis on the hops that were seen from the local trojan/worm/etc).

Like I said, it's not going to be perfect, but it is better than blindly
spewing out evil packets.

Jay

Let's all hope they keep to "blindly spewing out evil packets".

Like I said, it's not going to be perfect, but it is better than blindly
spewing out evil packets.

Between me and you, ospf packets or bad stp packets are a lot more dangerous
than the whack a cisco router. Just try it.

Alex

Another argument for OSPF authentication it seems. However we are still out of luck in the STP announcements
unless you configure all the neat little *guard features (bpdu,root etc) from Cisco et al.