Ransom DDoS attack - need help!

We received a similar ransom e-mail yesterday followed by a UDP flood
attack. Here is a sample of the attack traffic we received as well as a
copy of the ransom e-mail. Thought this might be useful to others who have
been targeted as well. I will have to talk with our upstream providers to
get a definitive on the size of the attacks. At the point in time we
blackholed our ip we were seeing 20+Gbps.

*Dec/07/2015 5:40:22PM *Here is a summary of the flows to our web server IP
during the ddos event:

hi joe

We received a similar ransom e-mail yesterday

:slight_smile:

dont pay real $$$ ... pretend that it was paid and watch for
them to come get the ransom ... never give your real banking info

ask them, where do you send the "$xx,000" mastercard gift card
by fedex/ups/dhl ... law enforcement might get lucky with real
physical addresses ... once in a while, there are dumb criminals
that show up on tv news

followed by a UDP flood attack.

*pout* or not ... their demo shows they've got the zombie botnet
capable of sending 20+Gbps .... law enforcement and ISP security dept
"should be interested" to trace them down ... but it takes
tons of (their) resources to take the next steps: who is it and
where are the attackers

*pout* ... udp ddos floods are "expensive" to solve ...

unfortunately, you cannot mitigate any incoming UDP-ddos attacks at your
server/router.... udp mitigation has to be done by"
- somehow, you need to find out who they are etc and legally seize their botnet
- your upstream ISP/peer whom doesn't send it to you
- or you setup and 2nd pipe at a geographically different colo ( cheaper )
- or you first send your udp traffic thru a ( expensive ) ddos scrubber

the idea of "limit" the udp traffic is basically useless, since
udp packets already came down the wire ...

you should at least not reply to any udp ddos packet
- don't send "host not available", etc etc

Here is a sample of the attack traffic we received as well as a
copy of the ransom e-mail. Thought this might be useful to others who have
been targeted as well. I will have to talk with our upstream providers to
get a definitive on the size of the attacks. At the point in time we
blackholed our ip we were seeing 20+Gbps.

*Dec/07/2015 5:40:22PM *Here is a summary of the flows to our web server IP
during the ddos event:

since it is a webserver they're playing with ... there's "dozen" things you
can do to mitigate the UDP flood attacks
- web server should only be running apache ...
  remove ntpd, bind, etc, etc, etc aka, remove the risks of udp amplification
- make sure required things like ntpd/sshd etc are using local non-routable ip#
- long common sense list of stuff to do ... including the 4 points listed above

everybody would want the timezone so they can check their "bandwidth" monitor
to see if 20Gbps hurts them too

Top 10 flows by packets per pecond for dst IP: 96.43.134.147
  Duration Proto Src IP Addr Src Pt Dst Pt Packets pps bps
     0.001 UDP 175.43.224.99 1900 22456 2048 2.0 M 5.8 G
     0.002 UDP 120.199.113.49 1900 54177 2048 1.0 M 2.8 G
     0.002 UDP 27.208.164.227 1900 54177 2048 1.0 M 2.7 G

what app do yu have that talks to port 1900 ?

these are probably spoof'd src address .... but you will never know
until you look up these ip# to see if there is any common link to it
like it all belonging to the same zombie net

for all ListofZombiehosts
do
- whois 175.43.224.99
- traceroute 175.43.224.99
done

- udp is primarily used for ntp, dns, nfs, x11, snmp, etc
  if the service is not used, turn off the ntp/bind/nfsd/X11/snmpd daemons

Top 10 flows by flows per second for dst IP: 96.43.134.147
  Duration Proto Src IP Addr Src Pt Dst Pt Packets pps bps
   248.847 UDP 41.214.2.249 123 47207 8.6 M 34594 133.4 M
   248.886 UDP 91.208.136.126 123 63775 6.7 M 26813 103.4 M
   150.893 UDP 85.118.98.253 123 47207 5.1 M 33843 130.5 M

they like to play with ntpd ... make sure your NTPd sw is patched

Top 10 flows by bits per second for dst IP: 96.43.134.147
  Duration Proto Src IP Addr Src Pt Dst Pt Packets pps bps
     0.002 UDP 92.241.8.75 53 5575 2048 1.0 M 12.4 G
     0.003 UDP 190.184.144.74 53 18340 2048 682666 8.3 G
     0.003 UDP 190.109.218.69 53 63492 2048 682666 8.3 G

they like to play with DNS ... make sure your bind sw is patched and
properly configured ( not open resolver, etc )

================================================

Copy of the e-mail headers:

Delivered-To: joe@joesdatacenter.com
Received: by 10.79.27.84 with SMTP id b81csp1190623ivb;
        Mon, 7 Dec 2015 15:32:22 -0800 (PST)

i assume this ip# is your own local lan ?

X-Received: by 10.25.88.208 with SMTP id m199mr28948lfb.157.1449531142088;
        Mon, 07 Dec 2015 15:32:22 -0800 (PST)
Return-Path: <armada.collective@bk.ru>

something tangible to trace/monitor

good luck trying to get bk.ru and their ISP to help resolve the ransom issue

  traceroute bk.ru
  traceroute mail.ru

  traceroute 217.69.141.11
  traceroute 95.191.131.93

  whois 217.69.141.11
  whois 95.191.131.93

politely rattle the security cages of the NOC for each of the ISPs that
is listed in traceroute and especially the IP# owner

Received: from f369.i.mail.ru (f369.i.mail.ru. [217.69.141.11])
        by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 7si214394lfk.103.2015.12.07.15.32.21
        for <joe@joesdatacenter.com>

...

Received: from [95.191.131.93] (ident=mail)
  by f369.i.mail.ru with local (envelope-from <armada.collective@bk.ru>)

....

Received: from [95.191.131.93] by e.mail.ru with HTTP;
  Tue, 08 Dec 2015 02:32:21 +0300
From: =?UTF-8?B?QXJtYWRhIENvbGxlY3RpdmU=?= <armada.collective@bk.ru>

....

X-Mailer: Mail.Ru Mailer 1.0

looks like they are using webmail ??

X-Originating-IP: [95.191.131.93]

mail.ru knows exactly who is/was using their ip# 95.191.131.93 at 02:32:21 +0300

Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2015 02:32:21 +0300
Reply-To: =?UTF-8?B?QXJtYWRhIENvbGxlY3RpdmU=?= <armada.collective@bk.ru>

...

If you haven heard for us, use Google. Recently, we have launched some of
the largest DDoS attacks in history.
Check this out, for example:
https://twitter.com/optucker/status/665470164411023360 (and it was measured
while we were DDoS-ing 3 other sites at the same time)
And this: https://twitter.com/optucker/status/666501788607098880

We will start DDoS-ing your network if you don't pay 20 Bitcoins @
19zErvraWpnLj4Ga7nsLXh8C52g1zogYJe by Wednesday.

orders of magnitude cheaper than tracking down who it is that sent
the email and chasing down their botnet

everybody in the world, should not be using any of the products/services
whom also support bitcoin or any other anonymous payment methods

Right now we will start small 30 minutes UDP attack on your site IP:
96.43.134.147 It will not be hard, just to prove that we are for real
Armada Collective.

tough group .... the FBI, interpol and especially the russian law
enforcement group should be interested to get hold of them ...
it will be expensive in time to track them down while they collect
enough $$$ from lots of folks that dont want to deal with the
primary issue of ransoms

If you don't pay by Wednesday, massive attack will start, price to stop
will increase to 40 BTC and will go up 2 BTC for every hour of attack and
attack will last for as long as you don't pay.

In addition, we will be contacting affected customers to explain why they
are down and recommend them to move to OVH. We will do the same on social
networks.

:slight_smile:

Our attacks are extremely powerful - peaks over 1 Tbps per second.

that should be big enough of an issues that all ISPs between them
and you would want to stop it too

it's gonna be expensive in time and staff to play cat-n-mouse with them

Do not reply, we will not read. Pay and we will know its you. AND YOU WILL
NEVER AGAIN HEAR FROM US!

:slight_smile:

magic pixie dust
alvin
# DDoS-Mitigator.net

These two presos discuss extortion DDoS and UDP reflection/amplification attacks, specifically - it isn't necessary to resort to D/RTBH to deal with these attacks:

<https://app.box.com/s/776tkb82634ewvzvp26nnout6v4ij39q>

<https://app.box.com/s/r7an1moswtc7ce58f8gg>

UDP 1900 is a "Chargen" UDP reflection attack. The DNS and NTP packets are
also from a reflection attack.

We filter UDP 1900 at our border. Not to protect our network from attack,
although it still helps. The packets might have come down our IP transit
pipes, which are high capacity, but we can still stop it from doing further
damage at the smaller pipes in our access network.

We filter UDP 1900 because too many of our customers run vulnerable CPE
devices that can be abused as a Chargen reflector. We stop that hard by
dropping UDP 1900 both ingress and egress.

He is being hit with a volume based UDP reflection attack. The IP addresses
are not faked. They all lead back to people that run vulnerable CPE
devices, NTP servers or open DNS resolvers.

Reflection attacks require that you have the ability to send out faked IP
addresses. Botnets are generally unable to do that. Their max attack size
is limited by the bandwidth at the server, where they have the ability to
send out faked UDP packets.

Keep attacking you if you do not pay is bad business. They could be
attacking someone who will pay instead. No one has infinite attack
bandwidth available.

Regards,

Baldur

what app do yu have that talks to port 1900 ?

UDP 1900 is a "Chargen" UDP reflection attack. The DNS and NTP packets are
also from a reflection attack.

Sorry I was made aware that UDP 1900 is SSDP. We still block it :slight_smile: To my
knowledge there is no real use case for it and no user has ever complained
about that being blocked.

Regards,

Baldur

fingerprint shows China and Russia related as expected
Why do the abuse teams in China and Russia ignore basic abuse reports, why peer/setup connections to companies where abuse is ignored.

Colin

I wonder how much of this is due to language difficulties.

Imagine if all your abuse messages and lots of this often informal
(and formal) documentation was in Chinese or Russian.

Maybe that leads to more poorly managed network facilities and these
miscreants take advantage of that.