prefix hijack by ASN 8997

: You didn't specify the time zone you are in,
: so I looked at +- 1 day around it. If the
: hijack lasted 6 hours, we should have seen it.

My apologies, I just used the time zone the tool (bgplay.routeviews.org/bgplay) was using when I said:
22/9/2008 9:00:00 and 22/9/2008 15:00:00

I'm sure it was in GMT. Seeing the many responses, we now know something happened and it was only about 15 minutes in duration. bgplay shows the problem with the above data and I was just wondering if I was understanding the impact correctly:

If the above two are correct, would it be
correct to say only the downstream customers
of ASN 3267 were affected?

I was not following the rules properly: never attribute to malice that which can be explained by human error. I thought there might be some testing-of-the-water in preparation for future 'events' and I guess I was starting to be trigger happy after all the talk about the new BGP attack.

scott

From: Marshall Eubanks <tme@multicasttech.com>

: You didn't specify the time zone you are in,
: so I looked at +- 1 day around it. If the
: hijack lasted 6 hours, we should have seen it.

My apologies, I just used the time zone the tool (bgplay.routeviews.org/bgplay) was using when I said:
22/9/2008 9:00:00 and 22/9/2008 15:00:00

I'm sure it was in GMT. Seeing the many responses, we now know something happened and it was only about 15 minutes in duration.

These two times are separated by 6 hours exactly (0500 and 1100 EDT).

There is a positive report at 1330 Moscow time or 0930 UTC or 0530 EDT.
There is a positive report "a few minutes" before 0122 UTC - say 0115
There is a positive report at 1222091563 which I cannot interpret. (1222 UTC ?)

We have my negative reports at 0607 EDT and 1207 EDT, etc., or 1007 UTC and 1607 UTC, etc.

So (all times UTC)

0407 no
0900 yes
0930 yes
1007 no
1500 yes
1607 no
2207 no
0115 yes
0407 no

So, do you think this was lots of little tests / hijacks / mistakes ? Or did it just not propagate very far ?

Marshall