Just a few off the top of my head:
1) Physical risk to facilities
This is a nightmare, most of our facilities *suck*.
Run an intrusion scenario against anything but the
absolute primo colo facilities and you walk right
in the door, and the primo ones are vulnerable to
mild levels of professional active threat (rocket,
bomb, wall breach, etc). There is too much money
in some of those buildings to treat this as lazily
as we do now.
2) Assured physically separate routing links
The current situation is unacceptable. We need to know
where our circuits physically go, and when that changes,
and have real options for physical routing.
3) Disaster recovery plans for facilities dropped into a hole in the ground
My current contract had just deferred a major expansion
on this issue. They're in a building clearly identifyable
on the San Francisco skyline. I expect this to be a major
reassessment starting tomorrow. You, too...
4) Echelon / snooping / crypto privacy issues
What sorts of likely issues will we see if there is
enhanced government monitoring mandated as a result
of this?
5) Services provider load-handling
I was chatting with someone at cnn.com throughout the morning.
They had to roll literally dozens and dozens of additional
servers into service when the hits started rolling in after
the incident was reported first. It looks like everyone was
able to hold on in both the network and the source provider
side... but this needs a careful look for lessons learned.
-george william herbert
gherbert@retro.com