I recall a marvelous eighteen hour long global internet outage which I
believe occurred in 1997, but this was before I'd ever touched BGP. Does
anyone have the full story on this? I'm writing on article on the recent
troubles with Supro and my silly editor wants fact checking and all sorts of
stuff like that ...
Avi happened to be next to me when I read the first post in this thread - and re-read it out loud. I didn't even get to the end of the first sentence before he laughed and said "7007". (Avi & Vinny owned that together back then.)
Operational content: Who still has 7007 filtered?
Does anyone have the full story on this?
<http://www.merit.edu/mail.archives/nanog/1997-04/msg00444.html>
bottom line:
o do not redistribute bgp into igp
o do not redistribute dynamic igp into bgp
o filter your peers and customers
randy
And don't put all your most important infrastructure stuff (e.g. name server, mail server, shell host, etc.) in the first /24 of your /<shorter> allocation.
The biggest problem with 7007 was not that it announced a bunch of prefixes. It is that 7007 announced _classful_ prefix (it had been filtered through RIP, remember?) with AS_PATH of ^7007$. This means if you had a 194.1.0.0/16, you saw 194.1.0.0/24 from 7007, which is more specific. Why this is bad is left as an exercise to the reader.
And, of course, the problem persisted after the router in question was actually unplugged - not powered up or attached to any fibers/cables. Thank you Sprint for running beta code. 
Well, I hope I'm not butchering the story up too badly - got an 800 word
piece going up Monday on The Cutting Edge News and I'm doing something more
lengthly and bloggy tonight for DailyKos, whilst hanging around abusing one
of our spare 7507s with various new IOS versions.
Back on list
I doubt you will get skewered, I promise to read it
Well, I hope I'm not butchering the story up too badly
This has been written up several times before - in addition to the links in Richard's post, take a look at the following, including the links at the bottom of the page:
<http://lists.ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au/pipermail/lore/2006-August/000040.html>
Here's a thorough writeup on the Supro incident:
<NETSCOUT >
For examples of specific applications of *deliberate* (as opposed to accidental, like AS7007) route hijacking, see the following:
<https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-presentations/defcon-16-pilosov-kapela.pdf >
<http://www.renesys.com/blog/2009/02/stealing-the-internet-back-1.shtml>
<http://www.renesys.com/tech/presentations/pdf/blackhat-09.pdf>
and then for extra credit, think about this:
<https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-09/video/Marlinspike/blackhat-dc-09-marlinspike-slide.mov >
and this:
<http://www.unixwiz.net/techtips/iguide-kaminsky-dns-vuln.html>
OK, here is the expanded, bloggy one. Some time Monday the more
professionally written entry on The Cutting Edge News will be out and I'll
share that one, too.
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/2/22/23440/2313/339/700368
What was that story with an African routes some years back, any memories anyone? I am looking for a reference.
146.20.0.0/16?
Paul
that's erie forge/steal... I think maybe Gadi's referring to the 41/8
used by an italian DSL provider for their internal network?? (not
announced outside their ASN I don't think)
-Chris
What was that story with an African routes some years back, any memories
anyone? I am looking for a reference.146.20.0.0/16?
that's erie forge/steal... I think maybe Gadi's referring to the 41/8
used by an italian DSL provider for their internal network?? (not
announced outside their ASN I don't think)
Or the AFOL-KE thing with Above last March:
-danny
What was that story with an African routes some years back, any memories
anyone? I am looking for a reference.146.20.0.0/16?
that's erie forge/steal... I think maybe Gadi's referring to the 41/8
used by an italian DSL provider for their internal network?? (not
announced outside their ASN I don't think)Or the AFOL-KE thing with Above last March:
<NETSCOUT;
Thanks for all the references!