The problem that got us here was that registrars have
historically been not flexible enough at releasing
domains when the owners *did* want to transfer them.
The point I tried to make in my prior note was that not all domains have
the same temporal property of non-functional change. The "problem" that
you refer to exists for some domain owners. Bruce asked for the comments
of this subscribers to this list, on the current ICANN transfer process.
Since ISP/NSP/... change registrars (cosmetic non-functional change for
a cost savings of $0.10/day, maximum) almost never, it is wicked unlikely
that the authors of the current ICANN transfer process ever thought about
network infrastructure operators as affected or interested parties to any
"We" didn't have "the problem", historical or otherwise. With the exception
of operators who's business value is organized around resolution in under 3
days for new customers, not ongoing resolution after the 3rd day, or who's
business value is now organized or re-organized around resolution in under 2
hours with the new dynmaic update property of several registries, and not
ongoing resolution, "we" have been pretty much problem free in the registrar
and registry space since Jake Feinler and Jose Garcia-Luna ran the SRI NIC.
If webhosting outfits want to bundle registrar-reseller into their package
forcing registrar transition with renumbering, fine. But they are further
down the food chain.
If the registrars want to directly slam the end-users, that's fine too.
But short-term 1U renters and vhost operators and registrants aren't the
NANOG list, and that's what Bruce asked, cosmetically or otherwise, for
An unintended side-effect of "competition" between registrars is that the
named network infrastructure is someone's target of opportunity.
In his reply to my note, Bruce points out that the system works for all.
There are two classes of domain names already. Registry reserved and not.
Adding a record to the database, or a lookup in addition to the existing
access, to implement a third class, could get the domain names associated
with critical network infrastructure out of the risk pool for whatever the
transfer model de jour is for registrar competition, and make "rollback"
for this class technically distinguishable, therefor policy differentiated,
from the general zoo.
Why don't you collect the results of a survey of access ISPs and above
who change their own domain names registrars more than once every five
years and show me that NANOG is equivalent to email@example.com.