ARIN whois

Gee. We operated relay services for almost 4 years with only one incident before this summer. Since the antispammers started inciting attacks, we've been attacked more than 2 dozen times since July. Coincidence? I think not.

Also, there aren't very many _real spams_ in the attacks. The attacks are spamlike, but generally not spam. But the content of the messages doesn't matter. I don't care if its spam or not spam. Services rendered are worth money. We are entitled to collect the money regardless of the purpose of the relayed messages. If the money exceeds $5000, the unauthorized access becomes criminal. We complain to FBI. The "relayer" will be found. And we are still entitled to the money for the services provided.

    --Dean

Around 10:16 PM 11/21/1999 -0700, rumor has it that Forrest W. Christian said:

[ On Monday, November 22, 1999 at 14:16:25 (-0500), Dean Anderson wrote: ]

Subject: Re: ARIN whois

Gee. We operated relay services for almost 4 years with only one
incident before this summer. Since the antispammers started inciting
attacks, we've been attacked more than 2 dozen times since July.
Coincidence? I think not.

I think so. Lots and lots of people are suddenly finding their
previously un-touched open relays are now being abused. Just because
they're suddenly abusing you doesn't mean beans. Join the group, but
please stay in line and don't get pushy -- you're no worse of than any
of the rest.

Also, there aren't very many _real spams_ in the attacks. The attacks
are spamlike, but generally not spam. But the content of the messages
doesn't matter. I don't care if its spam or not spam. Services
rendered are worth money. We are entitled to collect the money
regardless of the purpose of the relayed messages. If the money
exceeds $5000, the unauthorized access becomes criminal. We complain
to FBI. The "relayer" will be found. And we are still entitled to the
money for the services provided.

No, you're not. No contract was entered into, obviously; and of course
if you didn't protect your services so that they could only be used by
authorised users then there's not much you can do to the so-called
"abusers". This is especially true when there are simple and obvious
technical means of providing guaranteed protection. It's like replacing
the key lock on an unattended service station with a big red manual
on/off switch and changing the neon sign to read "Free Gas -- Help
Yourself!" They're not jimmying the lock because there isn't one!