You want to move things like gtld servers,
yahoo/google (and other 'important' things), including
Do a deal with some porn hosters, they get 69.69.69.69
in exchange for advertising tons of free porn there
on their next spam run - win/win
brandon
this has been raised an issue before... but vanity ip address are a very
very bad idea.
joelja
OK... I'm late to this discussion (been mostly ignoring it due to volume in
other places), but, Sean's 911->855 mail makes me wonder...
It seems to me that it would be relatively simple to solve this problem by
doing the following:
1. ICANN (or an ICANN designee, such as ARIN) shall issue an ASN range
of 20 ASNs to be used as BOGON-ORIGINATE.
2. Each RIR should operate one or more routers with an open peering
policy which will perform the following functions:
A. Advertise all unissued space allocated to the RIR as
originating from an ASN allocated to <RIR>-BOGON.
B. Peer with the corresponding routers at each of the other
RIRs and accept and readvertise their BOGON list through
BGP.
C. Provide a full BOGON feed to any router that chooses to
peer, but not accept any routes or non-BGP traffic from
those routers.
3. Any provider which wishes to filter BOGONs could peer with the
closest one or two of these and set up route maps that modify
the next-hop for all BOGONs to be an address which is statically
routed to NULL0 on each of their routers.
Apologies if this has been discussed before, but, it seems to me that this
is the easiest way to make the data readily available to the community
directly from the maintainers of the databases in a fashion which is
automatically up to date.
Owen
OK... I'm late to this discussion (been mostly ignoring it due to volume in
other places), but, Sean's 911->855 mail makes me wonder...It seems to me that it would be relatively simple to solve this problem by
doing the following:1. ICANN (or an ICANN designee, such as ARIN) shall issue an ASN range
of 20 ASNs to be used as BOGON-ORIGINATE.2. Each RIR should operate one or more routers with an open peering
policy which will perform the following functions:A. Advertise all unissued space allocated to the RIR as
originating from an ASN allocated to <RIR>-BOGON.B. Peer with the corresponding routers at each of the other
RIRs and accept and readvertise their BOGON list through
BGP.C. Provide a full BOGON feed to any router that chooses to
peer, but not accept any routes or non-BGP traffic from
those routers.3. Any provider which wishes to filter BOGONs could peer with the
closest one or two of these and set up route maps that modify
the next-hop for all BOGONs to be an address which is statically
routed to NULL0 on each of their routers.Apologies if this has been discussed before, but, it seems to me that this
is the easiest way to make the data readily available to the community
directly from the maintainers of the databases in a fashion which is
automatically up to date.
As suggested, it has been discussed before. See:
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail-archives/lir-wg/2002/msg00815.html
Unfortunately, the answer I got from RIPE was that they will never do this.
-Hank
It seems to me that it would be relatively simple to solve this problem by
doing the following:1. ICANN (or an ICANN designee, such as ARIN) shall issue an ASN range
of 20 ASNs to be used as BOGON-ORIGINATE.
Why not just one or private/reserved?
2. Each RIR should operate one or more routers with an open peering
policy which will perform the following functions:A. Advertise all unissued space allocated to the RIR as
originating from an ASN allocated to <RIR>-BOGON.B. Peer with the corresponding routers at each of the other
RIRs and accept and readvertise their BOGON list through
BGP.C. Provide a full BOGON feed to any router that chooses to
peer, but not accept any routes or non-BGP traffic from
those routers.
Of course, configure it wrong and you would end up sending all the junk that you
would have null routed to your RIR. Sounds messy.
Whats more I can see potential whenever we start creating these kind of self
propagating blackholes for hackers to introduce genuine address blocks to create
a DDoS.
3. Any provider which wishes to filter BOGONs could peer with the
closest one or two of these and set up route maps that modify
the next-hop for all BOGONs to be an address which is statically
routed to NULL0 on each of their routers.
How many ebgp sessions do the RIRs need to maintain?? A lot.. and the
maintenance would be a nightmare. Dont think this will work purely because of
that overhead you create!!
Steve
Apologies if this has been discussed before, but, it seems to me that this
is the easiest way to make the data readily available to the community
directly from the maintainers of the databases in a fashion which is
automatically up to date.
There are other ways that dont use BGP peering to create lists that are more
suitable
Steve
It seems to me that it would be relatively simple to solve this problem
by doing the following:1. ICANN (or an ICANN designee, such as ARIN) shall issue an ASN range
of 20 ASNs to be used as BOGON-ORIGINATE.Why not just one or private/reserved?
Because I think there is value in each RIR having their own AS to peer
EBGP with the other RIR's. I have no problem with this comming from
reserved ASN space (that would be up to ICANN where they pull it from).
As to private, it would have two problems. One, it would violate the
RFC for private ASNs, and, two, it would likely conflict with existing
internal uses of private ASNs at some carriers.
2. Each RIR should operate one or more routers with an open peering
policy which will perform the following functions:A. Advertise all unissued space allocated to the RIR as
originating from an ASN allocated to <RIR>-BOGON.B. Peer with the corresponding routers at each of the other
RIRs and accept and readvertise their BOGON list through
BGP.C. Provide a full BOGON feed to any router that chooses to
peer, but not accept any routes or non-BGP traffic from
those routers.Of course, configure it wrong and you would end up sending all the junk
that you would have null routed to your RIR. Sounds messy.
I think there are ways for the RIR to protect themselves from this.
Whats more I can see potential whenever we start creating these kind of
self propagating blackholes for hackers to introduce genuine address
blocks to create a DDoS.
Only if the hacker manages to own one or more of the RIR routers providing
the feed. Remember, they will be configured not to listen to _ANY_
advertisement from any routers other than the other RIR routers that are
known to provide equivalant service for the other RIRs. As such, assuming
the RIRs run the routers with reasonable security precautions, I don't see
this as being any more of a DDoS risk than any large backbone provider
you can name today.
3. Any provider which wishes to filter BOGONs could peer with the
closest one or two of these and set up route maps that modify
the next-hop for all BOGONs to be an address which is statically
routed to NULL0 on each of their routers.How many ebgp sessions do the RIRs need to maintain?? A lot.. and the
maintenance would be a nightmare. Dont think this will work purely
because of that overhead you create!!
Nope... Yes, there would be _ALOT_ of ebgp sessions, but they wouldn't
be full-table sessions. They'd be send-only with a small number of
prefixes representing the bogon space. Also, it is possible to configure
most routers to peer with "all comers" and assign the ones that don't
have a specific configuration to a default peer group. That peer group
would be configured to advertise-only the bogon list and accept nothing.
With that configuration, the maintenance is near nil.
Owen