WSJ: Trade Center Attack Highlights Problem

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re: >One interesting thing I found during my research since September 11
is the Internet held up well because of its extensive use of alternate
providers. <

Lest we forget, there were considerable problems bringing certain IXs back on
line that were in the affected zone back on line for a over a week after the day
of the attacks, due to problems assoicated with on-site power generation. But
ignoring those exceptions...

... yes, the Internet held up nicely, like you say, but for many reasons,
including its use of alternate providers.

Another reason, if we're to look at this in a comparative sense (which I've
inferred is the case), that is, how the 'Net fared versus how 140 West Street
did, was because none of the Internet's main exchanges or hubs took direct hits.

ISPs and NSPs were spared a tremendous amount of grief, imo, but only as a result
of serendipitous consequences, because the Twin Towers were NOT located just a
couple of blocks closer to 60 Hudson Street. Even as it was, there was ongoing
speculation that structural damage did exist at 60 Hudson, but fortunately those
were _only_ speculations, as it turns out (and as far as I know).

But had the towers been an 8th of a mile closer to 60 Hudson things would have
turned out far differently for the 'Net, not only domestically, but
internationally as well.

Has anyone assessed the level of risk that exists to the 'Net due to the high
levels of traffic concentration at 60 Hudson. Or, 1 Wilshire in LA, for that
matter? Curious.

-FAC

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Lest we forget, there were considerable problems bringing certain IXs back on
line that were in the affected zone back on line for a over a week after
the day of the attacks, due to problems assoicated with on-site power
generation. But ignoring those exceptions...

I remember them, and included them in my NANOG presentation. But if
you compare the NYSE restoration (with the full faith, credit and
Presidential order) versus no-name carrier hotel restoration things
aren't straightforward. Even with the diversion of Verizon's resources
to the NYSE, the carrier hotels got back on-line darn quick.

I mapped out all the CLEC facilities I know about in lower manhattan.
Some are very close to the WTC complex, others are far away. Some
were damaged, some weren't. That's the point of diversity. A couple
of CLECs suffered damage even worse than Verizon. One CLEC's POP is
gone. It was pretty much luck of the draw what was damaged. The damage
isn't a reflection on the quality of any provider.

But if I'm a network manager, my concern isn't assessing blame but getting
my network back online as quick as possible. What is the best assurance
I can get my network online (assuming my own building wasn't destroyed)?
The best bet seems to be buildings with multiple carriers.

Has anyone assessed the level of risk that exists to the 'Net due to the high
levels of traffic concentration at 60 Hudson. Or, 1 Wilshire in LA, for that
matter? Curious.

As Yogi Berra said, "Nobody goes there anymore; it's too crowded."

Honestly, the data doesn't exist, so if anyone claims they have its
just a wild guess.

Given that, here is a wild guess.

Historically, based upon previous accidents and failures of major exchange
points, failures of "national" exchange points cause the least problems.
The loss of one or two national exchange points (there has been a dual
failure in the past) caused lots of traffic on NANOG. But the traffic
kept flowing. National exchange points tend to be bright, shiny beacons.
Everyone is (or should be) aware of the risk and engineer their network
with that knowledge.

Operator error and software bugs still cause the worst problems. The
worst physical failures have been in locations where no one realized
the risk existed.