is a massive route leak not even menntioned when it is only ipv6?
the guess i heard was it looked like a classic config reorigination
disaster.
randy
hey,
is a massive route leak not even menntioned when it is only ipv6?
We saw no impact to v6 traffic during the leak (and we have quite a lot of v6 traffic). I guess testament that RPKI works?
i saw a lot of them too in AS1239
doug
Has the route leak been resolved? BGPstream still shows it as active:
https://bgpstream.crosswork.cisco.com/
RPKI only worked where it is implemented.
I saw one path via Lumen (AS3356) and was disappointed to see it based on their blog from 2.5 years ago:
"Once implemented, Lumen will use RPKI route validation on all BGP sessions for both customers and peers. Lumen’s RPKI validation servers download the ROAs, examine them, then send the tables to routers that can determine the validity of an IP prefix."
MANRS confirms that AS3356 does not do much RPKI (see attachment).
Regards,
Hank
It was mentioned earlier today on another list as a presumed route hijack. I guess those making the hijack accusations aren't familiar with Hanlon's razor.
We saw no impact to v6 traffic during the leak (and we have quite a
lot of v6 traffic). I guess testament that RPKI works?
the packetviz (props massimo) reports i received would seem to indicate
that the blast radius was mostly contained to america latina collectors.
yes, likely due to route origin validation.
randy