Strange internet activity


Has anyone noticed any strange internet activity in the past few hours?
I have noticed lot's of client host generating a massive number of HTTP
GET requests to WEB servers (like a single host sending a flood of more
than 50 requests)

The clients seem to be windows boxs...


Are the requests coming in on port 443? This might be a probe or attempt
at exploiting the OpenSSL worm that's supposed to be running around.
There's been some discussion on bugtraq, and there's a mirrored archive

Someone may have written an exploit to probe using code for all
architectures indiscriminately. Unfortunately,
seems to be "undergoing scheduled maintenance" and with this wonky DNS
update going on, I'm not even sure I'm hitting the right server. Oh



CERT Advisory CA-2002-27 Apache/mod_ssl Worm

   Original release date: September 14, 2002
   Last revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

     * Linux systems running Apache with mod_ssl accessing SSLv2-enabled
       OpenSSL 0.9.6d or earlier on Intel x86 architectures


   The CERT/CC has received reports of self-propagating malicious code
   which exploits a vulnerability (VU#102795) in OpenSSL. This malicious
   code has been referred to as Apache/mod_ssl worm, linux.slapper.worm
   and bugtraq.c worm.

I. Description

   The Apache/mod_ssl worm is self-propagating malicious code that
   exploits the OpenSSL vulnerability described in VU#102795.

   This vulnerability was the among the topics discussed in CA-2002-23
   "Multiple Vulnerabilities In OpenSSL".

   While this OpenSSL server vulnerability exists on a wide variety of
   platforms, the Apache/mod_ssl worm appears to work only on Linux
   systems running Apache with the OpenSSL module (mod_ssl) on Intel

   The Apache/mod_ssl worm scans for potentially vulnerable systems on
   80/tcp using an invalid HTTP GET request.

          GET /mod_ssl:error:HTTP-request HTTP/1.0

   When an Apache system is detected, it attempts to send exploit code to
   the SSL service via 443/tcp. If successful, a copy of the malicious
   source code is then placed on the victim server, where the attacking
   system tries to compile and run it. Once infected, the victim server
   begins scanning for additional hosts to continue the worm's

   Additionally, the Apache/mod_ssl worm can act as an attack platform
   for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against other sites
   by building a network of infected hosts. During the infection process,
   the attacking host instructs the newly-infected victim to initiate
   traffic on 2002/udp back to the attacker. Once this communications
   channel has been established, the infected system becomes part of the
   Apache/mod_ssl worm's DDoS network. Infected hosts can then share
   information on other infected systems as well as attack instructions.
   Thus, the 2002/udp traffic can be used by a remote attacker as a
   communications channel between infected systems to coordinate attacks
   on other sites.

Identifying infected hosts

   Reports indicate that the Apache/mod_ssl worm's source code is placed
   in /tmp/.bugtraq.c on infected systems. It is compiled with gcc,
   resulting in the executable binary being stored at /tmp/.bugtraq;
   therefore, presence of any of the following files on Linux systems
   running Apache with OpenSSL is indicative of compromise.


   The probing phase of the attack may show up in web server logs as:

          GET /mod_ssl:error:HTTP-request HTTP/1.0

   Note that the appearance of this entry in a web server log is not
   indicative of compromise, but is merely evidence of a probe from an
   infected system.

   Reports received by the CERT/CC indicate that Apache systems may
   subsequently log messages similar to the following:

          [error] SSL handshake failed: HTTP spoken on HTTPS port; trying
          to send HTML error page (OpenSSL library error follows)

          [error] OpenSSL: error:1407609C:SSL
          routines:SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO:http request [Hint: speaking
          HTTP to HTTPS port!?]

   Actual log entries may vary from system to system, but will generally
   include an "SSL handshake failed" followed by an OpenSSL library

   Hosts found to be listening for or transmitting data on 2002/udp are
   also indicative of compromise by the Apache/mod_ssl worm.

Detecting Apache/mod_ssl worm activity on the network

   Infected systems are readily identifiable on a network by the
   following traffic characteristics:

     * Probing -- Scanning on 80/tcp

     * Propagation -- Connections to 443/tcp

     * DDoS -- Transmitting or receiving datagrams with both source and
       destination ports 2002/udp. This traffic is used as a
       communications channel between infected systems to coordinate
       attacks on other sites.

   Additionally, infected hosts that are actively participating in DDoS
   attacks against other systems may generate unusually high volumes of
   attack traffic using various protocols (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP)

II. Impact

   Compromise by the Apache/mod_ssl worm indicates that a remote attacker
   can execute arbitrary code as the apache user on the victim system. It
   may be possible for an attacker to subsequently leverage a local
   privilege escalation exploit in order to gain root access to the
   victim system. Furthermore, the DDoS capabilities included in the
   Apache/mod_ssl worm allow victim systems to be used as platforms to
   attack other systems.

III. Solution

Apply a patch

   Administrators of all systems running OpenSSL are encouraged to review
   CA-2002-23 and VU#102795 for detailed vendor recommendations regarding

   Note that while the vulnerability exploited by the Apache/mod_ssl worm
   was fixed beginning with OpenSSL version 0.9.6e, as of this writing
   the latest version of OpenSSL is 0.9.6g. Administrators may wish to
   upgrade to that version instead.

   The following is reproduced in part from CA-2002-23

Upgrade to version 0.9.6e of OpenSSL

     Upgrade to version 0.9.6e of OpenSSL to resolve the issues
     addressed in this advisory. As noted in the OpenSSL advisory,
     separate patches are available:

     Combined patches for OpenSSL 0.9.6d:

     After either applying the patches above or upgrading to 0.9.6e,
     recompile all applications using OpenSSL to support SSL or TLS
     services, and restart said services or systems. This will eliminate
     all known vulnerable code.

     Sites running OpenSSL pre-release version 0.9.7-beta2 may wish to
     upgrade to 0.9.7-beta3, which corrects these vulnerabilities.
     Separate patches are available as well:

     Combined patches for OpenSSL 0.9.7 beta 2:

Disable SSLv2

   Disabling SSLv2 handshaking will prevent exploitation of VU#102795.
   CERT/CC recomends consulting the mod_ssl documentation for a complete
   description of the options but one method for disabling SSLv2 is to
   remove SSLv2 as a supported cipher in the SSLCipherSuite directive in
   the configuration file. For example:

          SSLCipherSuite ALL:!ADH:RC4+RSA:+HIGH:+SSLv2

   which allows SSLv2 can be changed to

          SSLCipherSuite ALL:!ADH:RC4+RSA:+HIGH:!SSLv2

   which will disable SSLv2. Note the changing of +SSLv2 to !SSLv2.

   However, systems may still be susceptible to the other vulnerabilities
   described in CA-2002-23.

Recovering from a system compromise

   If you believe a system under your administrative control has been
   compromised, please follow the steps outlined in


   The CERT/CC is interested in receiving reports of this activity. If
   machines under your administrative control are compromised, please
   send mail to with the following text included in the
   subject line: "[CERT#23820]".


The traffic I have seen is originated from Windows workstations, so I
guess it is not this worm...