In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can.
Inferred improvements during Aug 2024:
ASN Name Fixed-By
55 UPENN 2024-08-06
394195 CLEARNETWORX 2024-08-12
25853 ELJY30540 2024-08-29
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Aug 2024:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
40676 AS40676 2016-08-29 2024-08-31
27364 ACS-INTERNET 2016-09-27 2024-08-29
1403 EBOX 2016-11-12 2024-08-27
2152 CSUNET-NW 2017-11-08 2024-08-28
33363 BHN-33363 2018-11-29 2024-08-30
21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2024-08-25
36352 AS-COLOCROSSING 2020-10-08 2024-08-23
4922 SHENTEL 2021-12-28 2024-08-22
12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2024-08-31
3701 NERONET 2023-04-18 2024-08-31
400282 2023-04-27 2024-08-30
393577 SCCNET 2023-05-03 2024-08-31
202400 2023-05-08 2024-08-26
61461 Airtek Solutions C.A. 2023-05-13 2024-08-16
394684 WISPERNET 2024-01-17 2024-08-30
214961 2024-05-14 2024-08-30
393530 TLU 2024-05-22 2024-08-28
19935 CRRS 2024-05-29 2024-08-24
398182 BLN 2024-06-17 2024-08-15
216211 2024-06-22 2024-08-23
13371 DUKE-INTERCHANGE 2024-07-03 2024-08-14
57308 Rossvyazinform 2024-08-10 2024-08-24
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org