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Jim,
Agreed, so throw the bad route to the bit bucket and leave the bgp
session open, or at the very least (as others have suggested) give me
an OPTION to do that. Bad enough we were only operating at 33%
capacity, however, if we only had transit from the 4 that were giving
us the bad route, we would have lost connectivity totally. While it
would've been really cool to post an outage notification bragging
about our RFC compliance, and how it's everybody elses fault, I
(personally) would have preferred to stay connected to the internet
and not be losing revenue. Perhaps I just have my priorities wrong.
Matt
- --
Matt Levine
@Home: matt@deliver3.com
@Work: matt@eldosales.com
ICQ : 17080004
PGP : http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x6C0D04CF
- -----Original Message-----
Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2001 13:21:20 -0400
From: Matt Levine <matt@deliver3.com>
Agreed, so throw the bad route to the bit bucket and leave the bgp
session open, or at the very least (as others have suggested) give me
an OPTION to do that. Bad enough we were only operating at 33%
capacity, however, if we only had transit from the 4 that were giving
us the bad route, we would have lost connectivity totally. While it
<imesho>
On the surface, this appears to be correct.
But let's ask ourselves _why_ those upstreams had bad routes. It's
because _they_ did not filter at the edge. If bad routes leak, but are
filtered before reaching the core, then they never make it to you.
IOW, your concern is a non-issue if the large providers apply similar
filtering at the edge. You wouldn't be cutting yourself off because the
provider in question would have filtered it long ago.
Do it at the edge, and the Internet does not become any more brittle.
As for making money... if the general agreement is that "BGP death
penalty" is correct, let the violators and bad BGP speakers face the
consequences of spewing garbage.
</imesho>
Eddy
Indeed. But, why stop with this very superficial analysis? Why can't
we dig deeper into such details as:
- who started announcing cruft, and to who?
- which vendor's hardware/software passed it along, and which dropped
their BGP sessions, as they're currently required to?
- which providers were impacted, and to what extent?
and so on.
I'm sure most of us know the answers to these questions by now, and
those who don't, should. Shame we're all forbidden from discussing
things further in a truly open manner due to NDA. This was not the
case in the not-so-distant past; hopefully the climate will change in
time for future multi-provider incidents of operational concern.
-adam