RE: Attacks Expose Telephone's Soft Underbelly

Something I've heard zero about during the recent restoration procedures in NY
was the "mutual assistance program," or MAP, which is comprised of about a dozen
carriers in NY. MAP was conceived about ten years ago when the "Trillion Dollar
Gamble" document was issued to/by the financial community in NY under the aegis
of the Chamber of Commerce, and it allegedly played heavily into the restoration
of the '93 bombing. But it has been relatively quiet since then. Perhaps the
disruption of the bunker in 7 WTC caused those contingency preparations to be
aborted. Anyone with knowledge about this please email or post here.

Good use of the 911 response mechanisms to demonstrate your point, btw. Both
outwardly (the service provider, i.e., Telco, NSP) and inwardly (the user
organization, itself). To advance your point another step and to support mine, I
should point out that it is incumbent on enterprise IT organizations to ensure
that 911 capabilities are supported by PBXs, and now VoIP LAN platforms [call
managers and gateways], as well, in order to ensure employee safety on a 24/7

The same holds true for other, highly-visible services when given sufficient
priority, especially when mandated by law. Such would be the case with D/R
contingency preparedness when other aspects of public safety and welfare are at
risk. These factors all play directly into one of your main points, which is the
effect of throwing more cash at targeted applications.