Also keep in mind the trends that the "consumers" of the service use;
If ohare got nuked, you would also see a serious DROP off in
passengers; much as the airlines are seeing right now. If PAIX fell
into the ocean, presumably there would be other things going with it,
and there would be an INCREASED usage on the net as people try to
scour for information..
Not that that's particularly related to the issue, just another
example of why it's a poor analogy..
My $0.02
Regards,
Matt
(BTW, I'm flying thru ohare tomorrow, so if anybody has
aforementioned intentions, please re-schedule.)
> But there was a point in time when taking out a certain parking garage
> in Va could have caused us a very great deal of difficulty. But I'd say
> we are past that, for the most part.
Are we?
When 25 Broadway failed, approximately 1% of the global Internet
routing table also disappeared. Which I would guess qualifies it
as a "major" hub.
But does that mean that X number of sites were unreachable, or that
there were simply Y number fewer routes to X sites? (Excluding those
*directly* affected, ie; those *in* 25 Broadway)
Verizon still has 100,000 lines out of service, and only now
begun to restore service to "small" businesses.
Yes, but my understanding was that we were referring to IP traffic. POTS
doesn't exactly have a built-in routing protocol.
A couple of years ago a fiber cut in Ohio disrupted about 20% of
the Internet routing table.
But again, does this mean that 20% of the Internet was unreachable, or
that there were 20% fewer routes to a given number of (hopefully
multihomed) sites?
No, this question is not rhetorical... I simply don't have any imperical
evidence to look at that could adequately answer this question.
One thing to keep in mind that the number of routes that disappeared from
the routing table, while a start, is in no way the final arbiter of how a
particular incident affected the internet's performance. While the direct
effect is obvious, other, less easily measurable consequences can result
from the loss of capacity producing congestion on the remaining network
infrastructure, as well as increased latency resulting from longer
backhauls. If there's plenty of available backup bandwidth, this effect
wil be minimal, but if not, let the pain begin.
As an example, a certain DSL provider has had to reroute their Covad PVCs
from 25 Broadway to their Boston and Washington, DC installations, resulting
in their capacity to Covad in those locations being almost completely
pegged 24/7. Not fun to be their customer in any of these areas right
about now.
dont forget too that a good part of transatlantic
fiber is backhauled through the holland tunnel into
lower manhattan, one of many reasons why all the
co-los are on the lower west side (in addition to
cheap buildings with heavy load capacity). also one of
the (again many) reasons i presume the tunnel has
remained closed.
according to Telegeography, Inc of Washington DC most
of the BIG capacity cables like Mercus-1 and TAT14
come ashore in New Jersey around Manasquan. its mostly
the older stuff that arrives on Long Island.
Which brings me back to my original question. Are there specific
locations which are more important to the functioning of the Internet
than others? You can't simply say everything is important. The FAA
Ona physical layer, there are WAY too many points where lots of
fiber from multiple providers crosses the same bridge.... uses the same
railroad right of way... too many to think about and stay sane,
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2001 18:17:45 -0400 (EDT)
From: mike harrison <meuon@highertech.net>
Ona physical layer, there are WAY too many points where lots of
fiber from multiple providers crosses the same bridge.... uses
the same railroad right of way... too many to think about and
stay sane,
Considering the high cost of right-of-way, it's no wonder. I
wonder if this will affect people's and various jurisdictions'
views on the importance of allowing companies to dig.
I agree that the lack of physical redundancy is scary. But,
given the difficulty of negotiating ROW, how does an entity
competitively dig where no one has dug before? Right of way...
the final frontier. (Apologies to Voyager.)
Everyone:
I know it's difficult to refrain from comment, but let's try to remember
that the bad guys read this list too. While they may not have the knowledge
of critical communication infrastructure points, they can certainly find and
target them if we point them in the right direction.
This pertains not only to our side of the ponds, but to overseas as well.
We all know where the 'soft targets' of our infrastructures are located -
let's keep it to ourselves or, at the very least, within small private
discussion groups where everyone knows everyone and not on the public list.
Tim
Why would security by obscurity work in this case?
Any terrorist with a quarter of a clue can find out the addresses of enough critical buildings to cause a huge disaster in about 30 minutes (*hint* Find sites for providers that have hardware coloed in major buildings and that list the addresses of these POPs. No names will be provided, but I have at least one in my mind. Repeat this process with some major peering points, a listing of which is quite easy to find).
I might add that it's much easier to find this out than it is to crash some airplanes into prominent US buildings; I doubt a 30 minute Google search would tell you how to pilot airplanes, but perhaps I'm just a little naive.
Locating carrier hotels, fibre landing points, cable routes, and other
key infrastructure locations is by no means difficult. I'm all for
ridding the world of terrorism and whatnot, but it's not like we're
doing anyone a favor by falsely maintaining a veil of secrecy.
I know it's difficult to refrain from comment, but let's try to remember
that the bad guys read this list too. While they may not have the knowledge
of critical communication infrastructure points, they can certainly find and
target them if we point them in the right direction.
I'd actually argue the opposite. It's difficult to face this, but we know
we ARE vulnerable. The important long term solution is that we need to
address our weaknesses. By acknowleding where the critical points are,
AND PLANNING TO DEAL WITH THEIR LOSS, we make the system that much harder to
defeat.
It's burying of our heads in the sand that caused the problem in the
first place (the WTC bombing, that is). People thought it would be
easier to pretend terrorists would never figure something like this
out, than asking if 'feel-good' measures with no real substance were
worth bothering with.
This pertains not only to our side of the ponds, but to overseas as well.
We all know where the 'soft targets' of our infrastructures are located -
let's keep it to ourselves or, at the very least, within small private
discussion groups where everyone knows everyone and not on the public list.
While I'd agree that there's no reason to constantly advertise the problems,
it's in free and open discussions that the best solutions are often found.
Groups of known members have a tendency to fall into patterns, missing the
same holes and making the same mistakes. The more open the group, the more
likely any solutions will solve the general case instead of focusing on
the same details and missing others. (Granted, it's also more likely that
discussions will fall into petty bickering, but hopefully we're all motivated
enough to come back to looking at the real problem)