http://volokh.com/2010/06/13/32843/
What happens when the US shuts down part of its part?
Depends on what part it shut down, of course.
But what are the available boundaries for the parts in question?
Will that have to change?
For example--what happens when name-service information for a part that
is not shutdown comes from a part that is?
What if an exchange point for parts that are not shutdown is shutdown.
And spare me the tinfoil hat stuff--tinfoil hats have not worked for a
year or more.
Generally speaking, it will be treated as damage and routed around.
Owen
Taking into account a submarine cable structure like this:
http://www.telegeography.com/product-info/map_cable/images/cable_map_2010_large.png
And that satellite connections have very high latency.
I think the idea of routing around will be, at least, a performance hell.
It's always been a BCP good idea to have your DNS have secondaries in another
non-fate-sharing AS, even though everybody from Microsoft on down seems
to feel the need to rediscover this.
Postel used to advise having them on different tectonics plates (and sources of power, of course.)
Conflating the "liberal in what you accept" advise, it might be wise to accept tectonic as covering tectonic shifts in politics, as well as land masses.
d/
Nothing to see here. Move along. Nothing to worry about. Have a nice day.
How about if the source database (not the relevant zone file, but the
collection of data on some computer from which a zone file is created.
How about the case where the master zone file has be amputated and the
secondaries can no longer get updates?
We just saw that with Haiti.
~Seth
For example--what happens when name-service information for a part
that
is not shutdown comes from a part that is?
What if an exchange point for parts that are not shutdown is shutdown.
And spare me the tinfoil hat stuff--tinfoil hats have not worked for a
year or more.
--
Somebody should have said:
A democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for
dinner.
We can play "what if" all day long and wargame all sorts of scenarios
but what it all boils down to is that there is really no such thing as
"The Internet". Just exactly how would the government implement any
policy that involved shutting things down and to what extent could they
accomplish anything without hurting themselves? What if your NSP is a
foreign company? Can our government tell a French company that they
cannot communicate with someone else? Can our government tell any
American company that they cannot communicate with another American
company within the US? Do you "white list" certain communicators and
allow them access while denying others? If so, how do you prevent your
white list from becoming obsolete the day after it is produced?
When you start disconnecting data communications you begin to impact
such things as voice communications, news media dissemination of
information, individuals in key positions losing a communications path,
etc.
The notion of government being able to "shut down" portions of "the
internet" sounds easy to do in theory but I am not sure it has been
thought through at the practical level.
I would seem to me that the only effective way one could implement such
a policy is to initially shut down ALL communications and then gradually
certify various nodes for reinstatement into the net. I have no
confidence that the government could ever pull such a thing off.
G
This overlooks the consequences of that particular catastrophic event
on locally routed, and indifferently named resources, within the area
directly affected by the event.
The hard, even desperate struggle, to keep the physical level
infrastructure powered, and operate link and above level services,
using pre-event and ad hoc post-event resource to address mappings was
not an exercise staged to demonstrate server configuration errors
(these happen quite frequently, and without casualties) or network
partition events (these too happen quite frequently, also without
casualties).
The Lieberman, Collins (R-ME) and Carper bill, like the Rockefeller
and Snowe (R-ME) bill, offers nothing to the repair, or proactive
resilience of the Haitian network.
I am content that Congresswoman Chellie Pingree, of Maine's 1st CD,
assisted significantly in the effort to keep the Boutillier facility
fueled in the last weeks of January.
Network infrastructure security can be distinguished from
cybersecurity in the first instance by actual existence.
Eric