New peering criteria

Mailman List Mirror (Read Only)
1

I agree, but how do you decide who is hurt more?

And therefore who should be the vendor and who is the customer?

Is the "bigger" network always the vendor, or is the network with more
content the vendor, or the network with more eyeballs the vendor? That's
what I don't understand about the "balance" requirement. Ok, so you know
the traffic is imbalanced, but whose fault/hurt is it when traffic is
imbalanced? And who is responsible for "fixing" the imbalance in traffic?

The simple answer is I'm the vendor and you are the customer, so you should
pay me.

The more difficult answer is one side turns off the connection (C&W) and
the first side to blink is the customer (C&W). If C&W didn't feel any
pain, why would they turn the peering sessions back on?

2

I agree, but how do you decide who is hurt more?

Turn off connectivity and see.

And therefore who should be the vendor and who is the customer?

See above.

Is the "bigger" network always the vendor, or is the network with more
content the vendor, or the network with more eyeballs the vendor? That's
what I don't understand about the "balance" requirement. Ok, so you know
the traffic is imbalanced, but whose fault/hurt is it when traffic is
imbalanced? And who is responsible for "fixing" the imbalance in traffic?

The simple answer is I'm the vendor and you are the customer, so you should
pay me.

The simple answer is: Do the people you are selling to ask how your
connectivity to <Network A> is AND if Network A's sales people get asked
the same question about _your_ network.

If not, then giddy up and start following the "sales process (C) 2001 smd"

/vijay "time to put the peer back in peering" gill

3

I agree, but how do you decide who is hurt more?

And therefore who should be the vendor and who is the customer?

Is the "bigger" network always the vendor, or is the network with more
content the vendor, or the network with more eyeballs the vendor? That's
what I don't understand about the "balance" requirement. Ok, so you know
the traffic is imbalanced, but whose fault/hurt is it when traffic is
imbalanced? And who is responsible for "fixing" the imbalance in traffic?

In the telecommunications industry the role of "vendor" is played mutually
depending on the initiation of the transaction. The finite start and
stop point (or "call minute" as Geoff Huston referes to it) allows
exchanging parties to assign cost for a specific transaction and a
specific time.

Since we have no such transaction basis in the Internet model, we are
forced to rely on intangible metrics that can not be easily
quantified. The examples are as old as "peering" itself; traffic levels,
number of customers, operational impact, geographic reach, et
cetera. The "peering" agreements derived from this criteria force certain
parties into a virtual hierarchy. One who does not meet a specific set of
intangible qualifications is not eligble for a particular arrangement that
is deemed favorable, and is forced into a less favorable arrangement.

Why did the majority of providers choose to adopt the settlement models of
the few? Obviously they had to. What is surprising is that some parties
who are obviously economically disadvantaged in such arrangements continue
to fight for the model as a primary means of settlement.

I say economically disadvantaged because it is often the case that in an
equal trade, not all things are equal. When I look at the models in place
around "peering" agreements today, I am forced to wonder who is the
beneficiary in this transaction?

Put in another light (and as the saying goes): If you are playing poker
and can not identify the sucker, YOU are the sucker.

One thing that is certain is that the current models make the benefits of
more mature markets difficult to obtain. Hedging would be a primary
example.

Perhaps continued outages attributed to inequitable settlement
arrangements will prompt greater focus on the "data transaction issue".

Regards,
James

4

Turn off connectivity and see.

> And therefore who should be the vendor and who is the customer?

See above.

I would imagine that such actions tend to irritate the hive of regulatory
officials. Self regulation would be one way to prevent such action.

Regards,
James

5

Since I've been quoted in this stream, maybe I should humbly offer a few opinions masquerading as observations ( :slight_smile: )

The peering game has no real objective rules - its a game that is played out in the jungle every night - you see a pair of eyes a few inches in front of you - should you try to eat it or try to get away? Unfortunately there's not enough information to make a rational choice, so you would normally run away, but if you are also hungry at the same time.....

The interactions in the inter-Provider space tend to work out to one of three outcomes:

   1 Either A pays B unconditionally (and becomes a customer of B)
      (and, yes, this includes 'paid peering')

   2 A and B do not interconnect directly, and resolve connectivity through third party interactions

   3 A and B interconnect and agree not to pay each other - i.e. peering

There's simply not enough information at the packet header level (the 20 bytes of IP header) to calculate a 'true' value transfer per packet passed between the two providers, so the call minute arrangement calculation used in the PSTN is simply not an option here. Instead, you inevitably arrive at one of the three outcomes above.

Peering is a game of working out that there is perceived equity in the benefits of the arrangement. Sometimes this is established as equity of denial - i.e. if both parties are equally disadvantaged by NOT interconnecting directly, then peering is a logical outcome. If one party is perceived as being more disadvantaged by such an outcome, and both parties can privately admit to themselves that this is the outcome, then that party becomes the customer of the other, if they interconnect.

The issue is one of figuring out equity of perceived benefit. If A works out that the benefit to A is $10 and its calculation of the benefit to B is $10, and _at the same time_ B undertakes a similar calculation and works out that the benefits to A is $20 and the benefit to B is $20, peering is still a stable outcome. Even if A works out that it is better off than B AND at the same time B works out that it is better off than A as a result, then peering is still a stable outcome.

Over time A and B change their perception of their own value and their perception of the value to the other party. If A and B are peering, then A naturally wants to create a situation where if can force B to become a customer, and B has precisely the same motivation. The forcing function used is sometimes one of disconnection.

Sometimes its a three or more party game - to demonstrate that A no longer relies on B's transit services, A may become a customer of C and then approach B for peering. If A can negotiate a peering relationship with B on this basis, A can subsequently renegotiate its arrangement with C. And so on and so on...

Its not a bad trading market, as trading markets go. Open information of trade outcomes is available in the BGP table, so that the market can be considered to be a well informed market even though individual negotiations and outcomes are private. Its an interesting outcome to consider the BGP table as the stock exchange listing service of the inter-provider trading market.

Geoff