New Denial of Service Attack on Panix

Alan Hannan writes:

  Could we drop the SYN/Denial thread? It's becoming rather base.

  I think there are other larger issues at stake in the world, like
  routing table growth, code problems, and short-thinking providers
  who don't retain talent to intelligently/reliably grow their network.

I think you are seriously underestimating the damage caused by this
problem. We've already had at least one ISP nearly shut down by this,
threatening people's livelyhoods. If someone shut down GI.NET with
this tool, you would probably find it to be a pretty damn critical
problem from your perspective.

This is a far bigger immediate threat than routing table growth. If
fixes aren't deployed soon, the internet will be in serious
trouble. Luckily, as with most internet crises, we will deploy fixes
and get around this -- the internet is not going to die. However, I
will point out the reason that the internet doesn't die when we have
crises is that we deploy fixes. We will survive this, BUT ONLY IF WE

I agree that in the *long term*, routing table growth is a bigger
problem, since in six months we will have fully fixed this particular
problem and routing tables will still be with us. However, if you
think long and hard about the sorts of damage that could be done by a
sufficiently psychopathic individual using this tool you will realize
that having routes depends on having an internet that functions, and
that keeping the internet functioning at all is no less important than
having it function in the long term.

We must fix this problem now, and until the majority of ISPs are
filtering their outbound packets, the topic must remain important.

So, if you want us to quit talking about it, please do your part. Is
GI.NET filtering its outbound packets yet?