If Verisign *really* wants to help ...

The logical follow-on to IP-based Sitefinder is SS7-based Phonefinder. I
propose we redirect all "not in service" telephone numbers to Verisign's
CEOs direct telephone number.

--lyndon

NT as a file server is faster than a dead bat carrying Post-It notes
underwater. But not by much.

Actually, AT&T already tried that once upon a time.

If you dialed a number that was busy or not in service it redirected you
to a "helpful" recording offering for a small charge to ring you back
when the number was available.

AT&T discontinued it less than a week later.

Of course, folks realize that Verisign is now one of the largest SS7
network operators in the world. Almost all CLECs in the USA use
Verisign's SS7 network.

Verisign has become the single point of failure for almost all of the
USA's public networks (voice, data, Internet, etc).

Verisign has become the single point of failure for almost all of the
USA's public networks (voice, data, Internet, etc).

I seriously don't like this situation, especially considering latest
marketing twists with verisign's new "services". What we have however are
number of people working there have good technical experience running
registry services (i.e. root dns, .com registry, ss7) but their managers
who came from verisign itself are not interested in maintaining good level
of service for such core services but rather extracting largest amount of
money from these services which.

If Verisign is to continue operating these core services (root dns, registry,
ss7), they will need to be COMPLETELY separate from their other units
(domain register) and run them as public trust. Or it may be best if
Verisign were forced (by goverment and/or icann agreements) to move these
into separate, possibly non-profit company like it was done when Internic
(aka NSI) IP registration services were moved to ARIN.

Just out of curiosity, why did they discontinue it?

Here in Bell Canada land, this type of thing has been around for hm... 8
years or so? There was a big outcry the first week or so from dialup users
(at the time, busy signals were more common than now), then eventually they
all did the *XX code to permanently disable it. It is still enabled on new
[residential, at least] POTS lines.

Vivien

I fairly certain the previous poster is talking not-in-service numbers, not busy numbers. Busy number redial is available here in the states, but most places you have to bang a *XX code when you get the busy signal, you don't tend to get any recording for it. Not in service numbers may get the LATA unable to connect or unable to route service depending on if the number you dialed was even in LERG. The system only does that in the even that it actually rang (and ringing in this sense doesn't mean you heard a ring generator on your end).

And yes, for the benefit of the others on NANOG, the process is more complicated than that, so lets not start another even further off-topic thread on the TDM/POTS system. And how it routes, or fails to route, calls.

Of course, folks realize that Verisign is now one of the largest SS7
network operators in the world. Almost all CLECs in the USA use
Verisign's SS7 network.

Verisign has become the single point of failure for almost all of the
USA's public networks (voice, data, Internet, etc).

That gets even more frightening when you look at the background of Verisign's
management team. I'm not usually one to buy into conspiracy theorys, and,
I'm not suggesting any evidence supports one here. However, these guys are
from the government, and, it's obvious they're not here to help.

If you look at the Verisign/NetSol management team, you'll see that it has
a large contingent of ex-CIA/NSA/etc. I don't know this is bad, but, I know
it can't be good. (Think Carnivore)

Owen

Wow, and here comes the Tri-Lateral Commision :frowning: So what if they were
former Gov't employees? They were likely culled from the copious numbers
of ex-gov't folks in the Washington, DC area. That and they opening some
doors via networking and contacts in the DC area for Verisign. I'm not
sure that their background has really any bearing in this case.

A case where it DID would be them directing ALL domains through a central
location for monitoring, which clearly isn't happening here.