At this month's FCC rulemaking meeting, it will consider
Promoting Caller ID Authentication to Combat Spoofed Robocalls – The Commission will consider a Report and Order that would continue its work to implement the TRACED Act and promote the deployment of caller ID authentication technology to combat spoofed robocalls.
(WC Docket No. 17-97)
So I have a question: what percentage of traffic in the US is really coming from the legacy PSTN? My understanding is that it's pretty low these days.
If that's true, it seems to me that this is a SIP problem, not an e.164 problem.
99%? If a phone number was used than the PSTN was used. The fact that SIP is involved in part or all of the call path is not very relevant except for peer-to-peer stuff like whatsapp, skype, signal, telegram, etc. (and even those don’t use SIP, but I think you meant voip more than SIP specifically) Even some of those can use e.164 for part or all of the path.
I do believe that if the robo call/scam/fraudulent call issue does not get resolved people may eventually start to give up and just use apps like that. Many probably have already.
I think people are making a distinction between the traditional way the PSTN works and direct interconnections\Neutral Tandem\Peerless\etc.
A *LOT* goes through at least one TDM transition (so you can kiss that identity header goodbye). None of the big names in long distance termination support STIR/SHAKEN. There's about 4-5 that will do STIR/SHAKEN outside of testbed connectivity (my employer is one). One big name is still using a self signed certificate to sign their STIR/SHAKEN calls, it'll expire in a couple weeks so they should figure life out quickly. I won't shame them here.
The lions share of intercarrier traffic won't go through SIP until the big ILECs are required to interconnect over SIP in reasonable and non-discriminatory ways. I'm not holding my breath.
(AT&T Wireless and Verizon Wireless hide behind their respective landline networks generally, and without SIP connectivity to those, you won't be getting green checkmark calls to people on the two largest wireless carriers outside of private testbed connectivity anytime soon)
We're probably not communicating because lots of carriers are using VoLTE which SIP end to end, so that is a lot more that 1%. I know that my local telco uses SIP over fiber at the little pedestal which terminates POTS and never touches SS7 anything from what I can tell. e.164 addresses are a relic of legacy telephony signalling, even if they're still used to make the user part of a From: address.
We're probably not communicating because lots of carriers are using VoLTE which SIP end to end,
it's likely SIP end-to-end on the singular platform at that carrier
(LTE), but if the termination gets to 'not LTE'
handsets, it's not SIP anymore. If the call exits that carrier, it's
not guaranteed to remain SIP all the way either.
so that is a lot more that 1%. I know that my local telco uses SIP over fiber at the little pedestal
which terminates POTS and never touches SS7 anything from what I can tell. e.164 addresses
are a relic of legacy telephony signalling, even if they're still used to make the user part of a
What's the thing that matters here though?
"The call originator's 'true' identifying data can be carried
through the network to the recipient"
"decisions about termination of the call can be made reliably based
on the call source originator
right? Can that be done on the PSTN or the SIP-parts-of-PSTN or 'sip
over the wild internet' ?
yes, if you require your interconnect partners to not tell lies...