Although RPKI is voluntary and decisions are local, those decisions are also automated. DNS is voluntary, and decisions are local as well, yet the government has been able to leverage DNS to unilaterally seize domain names without due process. Like Maxwell's Demons, it's theoretically possible for ISPs everywhere to notice government malfeasance and rush to a unified decision to counter it. But in practice this never happens.
Preventing government manhandling needs to be a design goal.
Ah, the global system I was referring to was the RPKI as distributed repository of routing information. With consistent properties (data formats, security models, data validation techniques, etc) across all 5 RIRs.
What an ISP does with the RPKI data, interns of route filtering, is always a local policy decision. Somehow "global enforcement system" sounded like a vision where ISPs don't have a choice of how and where to use the system. Maybe I read too much into the phrasing.
In the end, I think the issues boils down to if the community has the desire and will to address the route hijack issue. If the answer is no, then no further discussion is needed. If the answer is yes, then it is best to discuss and compare real proposals / mechanisms to address the issue at scale.
I am still interested in some detail on the "tyranny implications". We can't address them until we know what they are and how they compare to any other solution that tries to address the same problem.
I was basing my comments on your statement "If only there were a global system.." However you slice or dice it, the tyranny implications have not yet been addressed. That certainly needs to be in front of any technical idea such as RPKI.
Although I haven't participated in the OT&E, nothing I've read in RFC 6810 talks about these issues. It talks about authentication and transport security, but doesn't talk about the potential for government interference.
If you are speaking of RPKI based origin validation, I am not sure "automated / global enforcement system" is a useful description. It does provide a consistent means for address holders to declare AS's authorized to announce prefixes, and a means for remote ASs to compare received updates vs such declarations. What the receiving AS does with the validation information is strictly a local policy matter.
Frankly, this is no more a "new automated enforcement system" than IRR-based route filtering has been for 20 years. The only difference is that there is a consistent security model across all 5 RIRs as to who can make such declarations and it is tightly tied to the address allocation business process.
I have seen a lot of FUD about the specter of interference, but not a lot of serious thought / discussion. Having a serious technical discussion of potential risks and mitigations in the system would be useful.
Scott and Doug,
The problem with a new automated enforcement system is that it hobbles both agility and innovation. ISPs have enjoyed simple BGP management, entirely self-regulated, for decades. A global enforcement system, besides being dang hard to do correctly, brings the specter of government interference, since such a system could be overtaken by government entities to manhandle free speech.
In my opinion, the community hasn't spent nearly enough time discussing the danger aspect. Being engineers, we focus on technical means, ignoring the fact that we're designing our own guillotine.