I have to agree with Dillon, the report was much more clear when names
were named, contacts tried were listed, and the actual numbers and
routes were specified. Although the report still wasn't complete (phone
numbers, etc), which might have allowed someone around here to give out
a better phone (if the contacts were obsolete).
Anyway, in future, let's not try to be quite so polite. Clarity is
necessary. But, at least some solutions were suggested, and we _can_
demonstrate that we are self policing!
Overall, I feel that this is yet another example of why the Routing
Arbiter is so important. We've experienced regular problems with bogus
routes for many years. Time to go back and re-read all those RFCs on
"policy-based" routing, which lead to BGP.....
> In this way you accomplish the following:
> 1) clear identification of the problem, i.e. blackholed routes
> 2) clear identification of who seems to be causing the problem
> 3) clear identification of the contact means that you tried and the
> results or lack thereof obtained.
Key fingerprint = 17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26 DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32
Key fingerprint = 2E 07 23 03 C5 62 70 D3 59 B1 4F 5E 1D C2 C1 A2